Running the Pentagon isn't most
people's idea of fun. The hours are long, the criticism is constant, and
the pay isn't much higher than the median household income in nearby FairfaxCounty. So it is getting harder to
find qualified people who are willing to serve in top Pentagon jobs. Democratic
administrations have a solution to the staffing dilemma, because almost
everybody in academia is a liberal. Places like Harvard's KennedySchool
are full of left-leaning scholars who have spent their lives studying
how to manage the federal government -- people who think that getting an
impressive title and making a bit above the median Fairfax income (about $100,000) sounds pretty
cool.
But what about Republican
administrations? They have a real staffing challenge, because
their main pool of recruits for government jobs is industry. Most of
the executives currently running companies have lucrative stock options and
other investments they would have to give up if they went into government, to
satisfy conflict-of-interest rules. And departing an industry job in
mid-career isn't like taking a leave of absence in academia -- your career
may never recover. So Republican administrations tend to
draw senior Pentagon managers from the ranks of industry executives who
have already retired, especially those who made their careers in the
defense industry.
Donald Rumsfeld thought that was a
good approach to populating his Pentagon management team, because he didn't
have much use for congressional staffers and other neophytes who lacked
"practical" experience. But here's the rub: the industry types
he picked for senior jobs ended up making multi-billion-dollar decisions
about their former colleagues and competitors. Take the job of Air
Force under-secretary, the position that oversees military space
programs. The Bush administration's first choice for that job
was Al Smith, former head of Lockheed Martin's space business. When Smith
withdrew in disgust over delays in the process, the administration turned to
Pete Teets -- another Lockheed space executive.
Nobody would accuse Teets of
favoring Lockheed while in the Air Force job. Quite the opposite: he waited
too long to kill a spy satellite that Boeing had won at Lockheed's expense,
despite copious evidence that Boeing was executing the program poorly. A
similar pattern unfolded with Teets' boss, Air Force secretary James
Roche. Roche was recruited from Northrop Grumman, where he had been a
strong advocate of the company's B-2 bomber. Once he arrived at the
Air Force -- not long after losing a succession struggle at Northrop -- he
became the bomber's biggest enemy. Roche departed the Air Force under a cloud,
and was replaced by former General Dynamics executive Mike
Wynne. Shortly thereafter, another former Northrop Grumman
exec named Donald Winter became Navy secretary, and almost
immediately launched a crusade against the shipbuilding business of his former
employer.
The latest chapter in this strange
litany is deputy defense secretary Gordon England's current campaign to kill
the F-22 fighter. England
played a central role in developing the F-22 while running the business that
became Lockheed Martin's fighter unit. He too lost a succession struggle,
and later went into government. Now he wants to kill his creation even though
it is the Air Force's top modernization priority, and spend the money on other
programs. Whatever his reasons for taking that position, you have to
wonder whether it really serves the public interest to give former
defense-industry executives a leading role in determining the fate of companies
that once employed them.