Let's start out with the following scenario, which is really not that
far away. Imagine two joint strike fighters launching on a long range
mission of maybe six or seven hundred miles, against moving targets of
an enemy column, like we saw in Afghanistan. Imagine those joint strike
fighters with sensors onboard, advanced electronically scanned radars
and electrical optical systems, which not only allow the pilot to
complete his assigned mission of targeting and killing those moving
targets, but also allow for the information collected to be parsed
electronically around the needs of the Joint Force Commanders. The
Joint Air Combat Commander and the Tactical Commander would then be
able to look at things like battle space damage, and what a particular
moving target set might be doing. They can see whether or not there's
been recent activity around old enemy formations. That information
would then be passed, collated and abstracted into a tactical
operational view, which can be used strategically by the Operational
Commander and the force inside that battle space. We're really not that
far away. And we have systems in current programming; MIDS and JITRS
are examples, which allow us to start forming that IP-connected battle
space. We're headed in that direction.
This innovation is going
to dramatically change the way we see the battle space and it's going
to lead to a battle space that will achieve not only real time, but
perfect battle space knowledge. I think the opportunities are very
exciting.
I'm here to speak about Naval air power. And air
power for us is not just our tactical air forces. I also want to speak
about the value of Naval air power to our nation, and to the Joint
Force.
But how do you measure that value? What's the yardstick
for the importance of what we deliver? How do you decide which programs
bring enough value and capability that they should survive the
budgetary process?
That's a real challenge, particularly for the Navy.
You
have to look a little bit sideways now, and you have to look into the
future for me to talk about that value and its strategic element. Why?
Because we have a very tough land-centric fight going on and we need to
win it. We need to win it for our men and women who have lost their
lives, not just for the Iraqis. We need to win that fight. But I need
to talk a little bit east and west of that fight.
I could spend this presentation talking about what the Navy's done, but I think the real value lies in where we are going.
So
how does the Combatant Commander choose to sway, deter or influence
countries or potential threats in the Western Pacific, the Sea of
Japan, or in the Straits of Hormuz? I believe the Navy's assured access
is the answer. By sea basing our air power in Carrier Strike Groups and
Expeditionary Strike Groups, we provide significant, sustainable, and
viable combatant forces to the COCOMS.
These sea bases have
names: Essex, Enterprise, Kitty Hawk, Nimitz, and Abraham Lincoln. If
you look at recent history, you'll see that we sea based special forces
on Kitty Hawk during OIF. We also sea based a humanitarian assistance
air force off the Abraham Lincoln and the Essex and Bunker Hill. Our
helos did a magnificent job there, and right now we're sea basing
combat power on Truman to fight in Iraq.
So how do you measure
the importance of these contributions? How do you measure the future
return on these investments? I think the Navy and the Joint Force look
at this question the same way.
We have four measuring sticks.
Are they networked? Do they provide persistent accurate sensors? Are
they precisely weaponeered, and is the platform cost effective and
highly capable?
Let me give you some examples.
I'll start
with one you probably didn't expect- our helicopter force. We're
investing in our MH-60 Sierras and Romeos for a couple of reasons. One
is they are going to become a larger part of our force. The War on
Terror is a littoral fight the Navy will be in for the next 20 or 30
years, which means we will have to remain as up close and personal as
we are in Afghanistan. By that I mean we're right up against the
littorals of Pakistan in OEF, right up against the littorals of Kuwait
in OIF, and we'll be right up against the littorals in Korea. Trust me,
we need that helicopter force to achieve a sustained maritime
dominance, which will allow us to close the sea base for the Joint and
Naval forces within. These technologically advanced helicopters will
also provide a distributed sensing and lethal force. So we see a
significant investment in our helicopter force.
Some system examples...
The
combination of JITRS and MIDS creates something very important. These
systems deliver, via an IP based network, an ability to parse,
prioritize and abstract tactical and operational pictures. MIDS will be
the tool to synchronize this information, and afterward allow us to
deliver a picture based on the needs of the Joint Commanders and the
tactical and operational forces. I can't tell you how proud I am of the
work being done by all the services, particularly the Air Force, toward
envisioning this future network as a self-healing, self-forming,
tactical and operational view of what the battle space ought to be. So
no matter what you put into it, an A-10 or an F-18, each platform has a
very particular role in informing that battle space, which then
seamlessly closes inside itself.
Two other systems that are
equally important to the Joint Force are AARGM and ICAAP III. Why?
Because any modern IADS has to be what we used to call suppressed, but
we're changing that fight from a suppression fight to a lethal fight.
AARGM is a synchronized, lethal and precise weapon. Combine that with
the sensing capability, the collaborative information and scope of
ICAAP III and we will be able to deliver a coherent electronic battle
space picture to the Joint Air Combat Commander. That will dramatically
change how we choose to fight. We can pick the right time. We will be
able to prioritize targets effectively and kill at a very high rate.
Those are two systems examples that are key to our future success.
On to our fiscal challenges...
We
decided to replace our maritime patrol and reconnaissance force with a
substantially smaller one. We call it the Multi-mission Maritime
Aircraft (MMA). This aircraft combines multiple sensors on one
platform, which presents a challenge. How do you process the variety of
information from those sensors? If you choose to push the information
off on the AOR satellite systems, you will suck the living daylight out
of the ones and zeros available to the rest of the force. So you have
to process that information onboard, and develop for the Navy a common
undersea picture, then distribute that picture to the Fleet Commander
and the Joint Force Commander. The MMA is going to change ASW, I
believe, from awfully slow warfare into a time-centric, high capacity
mission.
BAMS is our low orbit satellite. We're excited about
BAMS because through it we will have sustained, 100 percent dwell time
over the joint sea based force, which we can then use to build a
comprehensive battle space picture. NORTHCOM ought to be very
interested in BAMS, as well, since their homeland defense mission has a
maritime component, which would greatly benefit from BAMS capabilities.
The Navy obviously is committed to its air power. Our Navy is better
than any other because of its air power, because
