New Moves Could End Investment Slump
Feb 2, 2005
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The diplomatic thaw between Cuba and the European Union has received
lots of attention, but its impact is not likely to be dramatic.
Official
contacts will resume and European contacts with Cuban dissidents will
continue. European aid to Cuba will remain a dim possibility, blocked
as ever by Cuba's human rights practices.
Of greater importance
is a Cuban strategy of international economic alliances that may render
ineffective the new sanctions that are at the core of President Bush's
policy to force Fidel Castro from power.
Cuba's strategy has
borne fruit in recent months. It shows that Castro, like him or hate
him, remains nimble even at age 78 - and not only because he got back
on his feet seven weeks after fracturing his kneecap in eight pieces.
His new moves could end an investment slump and decisively boost Cuba's
economic health.
Oil. For more than a decade, Cuba has worked to
interest foreign companies in offshore oil exploration opportunities.
After failed attempts by French and Brazilian companies, Spain's Repsol
discovered high-quality oil last summer, but it was not enough to be
commercially viable. Last December, two Canadian companies, Pebercan
and Sherritt, struck offshore oil 35 miles east of Havana. This new
field is estimated to hold 100 million barrels - the equivalent of more
than three years of Cuba's current oil imports. Production could begin
this year. Separately, a Chinese company has entered a joint venture to
produce oil in western Cuba, and other companies from China, Brazil,
and Malaysia are exploring oil opportunities.
China. Last
November, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Havana and announced new
credits and aid for Cuba's schools, hospitals, agriculture, and other
sectors.
But the heart of his visit involved nickel, the
hottest opportunity in the Cuban economy. Cuba has the world's third
largest nickel reserves, demand is high, and the price is up 166
percent in the past seven years. China will modernize a mothballed
Soviet-era plant and exploit an untouched nickel deposit in Camaguey.
Its investments could nearly double Cuba's output of nickel, a
commodity that brought $1 billion in revenues last year.
Venezuela.
After Hu departed, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez visited Havana in December
to strengthen economic ties. In addition to continuing cut-rate oil
sales to Cuba, Venezuela plans to modernize an idled oil refinery at
Cienfuegos in partnership with Petrobras of Brazil. Venezuela will also
invest in a new thermoelectric plant at Mariel and supply coal to fuel
China's planned nickel operations.
Iran. On January 17, Iran
granted Cuba a 20 million Euro credit for energy, water, agriculture,
and other projects. Cuba is selling pharmaceutical products to Iran and
is assisting Iran in pharmaceutical production.
What do these deals mean?
First,
unfortunately, Havana is not expanding the economic reforms of the
1990's, such as self-employment and free-market sales of farm products.
Strengthening the state sector takes priority.
Second, Cuba
still has economic options, and they seem to have increased with the
leftward turn of some Latin American governments.
Third, not all
potential investors in Cuba are spooked by U.S. sanctions. By barring
American investors and deterring many Europeans, our sanctions seem to
invite the world's less savory regimes to establish a long-term
presence in Cuba.
Finally, Cuba's new economic partnerships will
blunt the impact of Washington's new sanctions, which aim to block up
to $500 million from an economy that grows, by Administration
estimates, by $835 million per year. New oil or nickel revenues alone
would make the sanctions' impact on the broad Cuban economy barely
noticeable.
As a result, the only strong impact will be felt by
Cuban families who no longer receive visits, packages, or cash aid from
their loved ones in America. It's hard to imagine that was President
Bush's intention.
Peters is vice president of the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va.
Copyright 2004
The Lexington Institute
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Lexington Institute. All rights reserved.
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