Daniel Goure, Ph.D. Remarks Print Page My original academic training and professional experience was as a Sovietologist, one who studied the workings of our erstwhile Cold War adversary. With the fall of the Soviet Union, interest in anything having to do with the doctrines by which the tyrants in Moscow ran their empire vanished. Because it had been such an abject failure in so many respects, virtually everything having to do with Soviet Communism, both theory and practice, were relegated to the ash heap of history. It is true that not much of value ever came from the Russians' efforts to apply the cockeyed theories of Marxism-Leninism to the real world. The one possible exception to this was the effort by Soviet military theoreticians to analyze and quantify the elements of state power and, in particular, military power. They made a science of military affairs. There was a multi-volume series of books on military theory, the laws and principles of warfare and methodologies for assessing the relative power of nations and armies. There were universities with the equivalent of tenured professor devoted to the subject. A central concept in Soviet-era military sciences was the "correlation of forces." This was the net balance of power between two nations or coalitions. It involved an assessment of both strengths and weaknesses. The military correlation of forces included the quantity and quality of the opposing armed forces, their armaments and even training and morale. In order to calculate the correlation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Soviet military scientists established a numerical value for all military units, their own, their allies and their opponents. Soviet, American, German and British units were generally rated quite high. Other allies, both East and West were usually rated much lower. One of the most important objectives of U.S. national security strategy throughout the Cold War was to maintain a balance of power vis-ˆ-vis the Soviet Union such that the leaders in Moscow would wake up every day knowing that it was not the right day to start a war with the West. This was accomplished by managing the correlation of forces, although we did not call it that. The U.S. managed a wide array of factors in its effort to ensure that the Soviet leaders believed the correlation of forces was not in their favor: of security alliances, a superior economic system, a massive nuclear arsenal and, most important, a qualitatively superior conventional military. The United States and its allies, particularly those in Europe, could not hope to match Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces one-of-one. In some areas, such as chemical warfare, artillery and ground-based air defenses, Soviet forces were quantitatively and qualitatively superior. The U.S. had to find other areas where it could establish superiority thereby offsetting areas of Soviet advantage and maintaining a favorable correlation of forces. One area where the United States developed and maintained a significant military advantage over the Soviet Union, one that influenced their calculations of the correlation of forces was in air power. U.S. (and allied) air power was a definite counter to Soviet advantages in armor and artillery. Moreover, NATO war plans sought to leverage its advantage in air power against Soviet/Warsaw Pact lines of communication in order to defeat their efforts to overwhelm NATO defenses with sheer numbers. In order to exploit its advantage in air power, U.S. and NATO forces had to achieve air superiority, at least for a time in over those portions of the battlefield that mattered. Without air superiority, U.S. and NATO forces would be rapidly overwhelmed. In essence, without air superiority, the correlation of forces might have been very different, at least in Soviet eyes. Without the specter of the U.S. gaining air superiority in the event of war, deterrence might have failed. Soviet military scientists also thought a lot about the nature of war. Through the study of military history, war gaming, exercises and mathematical analyses, they sought to establish a set of rules or laws that, if followed, would enable them to win any war. One such rule was the importance of winning in the initial period of a war. Success in the initial operation allowed the victor to set the conditions for the following phases, or the course of the war, leading to a successful outcome. The inability to win in the opening round, or initial period, made achieving a successful outcome much more problematic. We have seen the truth in the Soviet idea that the initial period of a war matters a great deal. The two wars in the Persian Gulf were won decisively and rapidly because the U.S. and its coalition partners dominated in the initial period. In the future, the U.S. intends to act even more decisively in this initial period, thereby shortening the course of the war, reduce casualties and damage and ensuring victory. U.S. air power will be the key to success in the initial period of any future war. But in order to employ air power effectively, the U.S. military must gain and maintain not just air superiority but real air dominance. Air dominance means the ability to go anywhere and do anything while denying the adversary the benefit of operating in or through the third dimension. Our future adversaries probably have learned the lessons of recent wars too. The seek to deny the United States access to their airspace because they know that if the United States can achieve air dominance and employ our airpower freely, they will lose the war. They know with air dominance, the United States will be able to win the initial period of the war, thereby determining its course and outcome. In effect, they know the correlation of forces is not in their favor. Therefore, they are likely to be deterred. This brings me to the role of the F/A-22. Simply put, the F/A-22 is essential to the ability of the United States to deter conflict, or should one occur, to win rapidly and decisively. It may be the single most important capability that the U.S. Air Force could deploy in the next twenty or thirty years. My logic is simple: The ability of the U.S. to win future conflicts rapidly and decisively is the best deterrent. This is a reflection, if you will, of a positive correlation of forces for the United States. Winning rapidly and decisively means dominating in the initial period of conflict, thereby helping to determine the course and outcome of hostilities. Winning rapidly and decisively requires, inter alia, exploiting the U.S. superiority in air power. Exploiting that air power advantage requires achieving rapid air dominance. Achieving rapid air dominance will be more difficult in the future than heretofore as a result of adversaries' efforts to deny the United States access to their air space. The F/A-22 can ensure the ability to achieve rapid air dominance. The F/A-22 is essential to everything the U.S. military seeks to achieve: dissuasion, deterrence or defeat of adversaries. Copyright © Lexington Institute. All rights reserved. |