The Honorable Dov Zakheim Remarks Print Page IT IS A PLEASURE TO SPEAK BEFORE THIS AUDIENCE. THE LEXINGTON INSTITUTE AND LOREN THOMPSON IN PARTICULAR, IS WELL KNOWN AS A SOURCE OF CREATIVE THINKING WITHIN OUR DEFENSE COMMUNITY. IT IS THEREFORE FITTING THAT THE INSTITUTE ADDRESS AN ISSUE THAT HAS BECOME EVEN MORE NEWSWORTHY IN LIGHT OF A RECENT REPORT ABOUT THE FUTURE SIZE OF THE F-22 FORCE. I WISH TO ADDRESS THREE RELATED ISSUES THAT APPLY TO THE FUTURE OF TACTICAL AVIATION. THE FIRST IS THE IMPACT OF COMPLEXITY AND COST GROWTH ON THE SIZE OF THE TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCE. THE SECOND IS THE NATURE OF BUDGETARY PRESSURES ON TACTICAL AVIATION FORCE GROWTH. THE THIRD ISSUE RELATES TO THE LIKELY NATURE OF AIR WARFARE OVER THE NEXT FEW DECADES. DURING THE MID-NINETIES, I CO-AUTHORED AN ANALYSIS OF AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION THAT PREDICTED A CRISIS IN AIR FORCE PROCUREMENT. A REVIEW OF HISTORIC TACTICAL AVIATION COSTS REVEALED THAT THE COST OF TACTICAL FIGHTERS HAD BEEN GROWING AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF 4 PER CENT. SINCE THE KOREAN WAR. IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT WERE THAT GROWTH RATE TO PERSIST INTO THE INDEFINITE FUTURE, THE COST OF NEW FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WOULD DOUBLE EVERY EIGHTEEN YEARS, THAT IS, IN LESS THAN THE LIFETIME OF THE AIRCRAFT THEY WERE MEANT TO REPLACE. STATISTICALLY, THIS PATTERN WOULD ULTIMATELY RESULT IN ONE OF NORMAN AUGUSTINE'S FAMOUS "LAWS": EVENTUALLY THE UNITED STATES COULD AFFORD TO ACQUIRE ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT EACH YEAR. THE REASONS FOR CONSISTENT ANNUAL GROWTH IN FIGHTER COSTS, WHICH APPARENTLY HAS NOT DEVIATED MUCH FROM THE FINDINGS OF A DECADE AGO, ARE NOT NECESSARILY EASY TO FATHOM. ONE MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT THAT MORE EFFICIENT PRODUCTION METHODS, INCLUDING COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING, MICROMINIATURIZATION OF COMPONENTS, AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF GREATER COMPUTING POWER ALL WOULD HAVE REDUCED COSTS, OR AT LEAST HELD THEM TO PAST LEVELS. THIS HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE, HOWEVER. TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT, COST STILL MIRRORS AIRCRAFT WEIGHT, A RELATIONSHIP THAT MIGHT HAVE MADE SENSE FORTY YEARS AGO, BUT IS BAFFLING TODAY. SINCE THE BASIS FOR COST GROWTH IS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD, IT SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE THAT SUCH GROWTH STILL PREVAILS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE IS NO END IN SIGHT TO THIS HALF-CENTURY OLD PATTERN. A MAJOR MITIGATING FACTOR, WHICH HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF DELAYING WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE INEVITABLE SHRINKAGE OF THE TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCE, HAS BEEN THE HABITUAL "STRETCHING" OF PROGRAMS. NEVERTHELESS, A DECADE AFTER MY ARTICLE APPEARED, THERE ARE ONLY TWO EXTANT PRODUCTION LINES FOR FIGHTERS, THOSE FOR THE F/A-18 AND THE RELATIVELY RECENT THE F-22 LINE, WHICH HAS UNDERGONE SEVERAL CUTBACKS FROM A FORCE ORIGINALLY PROJECTED TO EXCEED 700 AIRCRAFT. MOREOVER, THE F-22 MAY WELL COMPLETE ITS FORESHORTENED RUN BEFORE THE FIRST AIR FORCE/NAVY/MARINES JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ENTERS INTO PRODUCTION. AT THAT POINT THERE MAY BE NO AIRCRAFT IN ACTIVE PRODUCTION AT ALL . IT IS NOT MERELY A MATTER OF CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT COSTS, HOWEVER. EVEN IF AIRCRAFT COSTS COULD BE MITIGATED EACH YEAR, BOTH EXOGENOUS AND ENDOGENOUS BUDGETARY PRESSURES WOULD ALSO LIMIT TACTICAL AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND FORCE LEVELS. TURNING FIRST TO EXTERNAL FACTORS, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, THERE WAS LITTLE PRESSURE ON THE DEFENSE BUDGET GENERALLY, AND ON TACTICAL AVIATION IN PARTICULAR, DESPITE THE A GROWING BUDGET DEFICIT. THE ACCUMULATION OF DEFICITS, HOWEVER, MEANT THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THAT THE DEFENSE BUDGET COULD REMAIN IMMUNE FROM DEFICIT-RELATED PRESSURES. THAT INDEED APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE CASE IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS YEAR'S BUDGET. THESE MACRO-ECONOMIC PRESSURES DO NOT MERELY TRANSLATE INTO COMPETITION AMONG THE AIR FORCE, ARMY AND NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FOR DEFENSE DOLLARS, THOUGH THAT COMPETITION SHOULD NOT BE MINIMIZED. THE PRESSURE ON FIGHTER BUDGETS ALSO DERIVES FROM THE FACT THAT VIRTUALLY ALL ELEMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE BUDGET IN PARTICULAR ARE UNDER PRESSURE OF SOME KIND. IT IS THESE INTERNAL AIR FORCE PRESSURES THAT AGGRAVATE THE FUNDING CHALLENGE THAT THE AIR FORCE TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCE MUST FACE. TO BEGIN WITH, THE AIR FORCE SPACE PROGRAM REMAINS EXCEEDINGLY COSTLY, AND IS LIKELY TO BECOME EVEN MORE SO. A RECENT REPORT OF A DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD/AIR FORCE SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD TASK FORCE STATED BLUNTLY THAT SPACE PROGRAM COSTS WERE OUT OF CONTROL. IN CASE AFTER CASE, THE TASK FORCE POINTED OUT THAT INITIAL BIDS WERE ARTIFICIALLY DEFLATED. INDEED, THE TASK FORCE ASSERTED THAT, AS A RESULT OF SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS INHERENT IN A FLAWED ACQUISITION SYSTEM, 'PREDICTABLE" COST GROWTH FOR MOST SPACE PROGRAMS AMOUNTED TO OVER 50 PER CENT. AND AS MUCH AS 100 PER CENT. OF INITIAL ESTIMATES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE RELIANCE OF WARFIGHTERS UPON SPACE BASED ASSETS FOR A HOST OF OPERATIONAL NEEDS RANGING FROM WEATHER FORECASTING TO THE MOST HIGHLY CLASSIFIED FORMS OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING CONTINUES TO GROW. NEW AND MORE COSTLY PROGRAMS REPLACE OLDER ONES EVEN BEFORE THEY HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. WHILE THERE MAY BE MUCH MERIT IN MOVING QUICKLY TO LAUNCH A NEW PROGRAM, FOR EXAMPLE, INITIATING A TRANSFORMATIONAL SATELLITE (TSAT) AND CANCELLING HALF THE ADVANCED EHF SATELLITE, WHICH ITSELF REPLACED MILSTAR, THE BUDGETARY CONSEQUENCES NEVERTHELESS CAN BE SIGNIFICANT. OTHER PROGRAMMATIC REQUIREMENTS, LIKE THE NEED TO HAVE TWO SOURCES FOR THE EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (EELV) ALSO RESULT IN INCREASED COSTS THAT SEEMINGLY CANNOT BE AVOIDED. OF COURSE, THE INTERNAL AIR FORCE PRESSURES DO NOT END WITH THE SPACE PROGRAMS. NO SOLUTION HAS EMERGED AS TO HOW BEST TO MODERNIZE THE TANKER FORCE, YET THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE FORCE MUST BE MODERNIZED, AND THAT THE ATTENDANT COSTS WILL BE QUITE LARGE. LOOMING JUST BEYOND THE NEED TO MODERNIZE TANKERS IS A PARALLEL REQUIREMENT TO MODERNIZE THE MOBILITY FLEET. FINALLY THERE IS THE AIR FORCE PROGRAM FOR AN ALL-PURPOSE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, THE MULTI-SENSOR COMMAND AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT (MC2A) THAT WILL AMALGAMATE CAPABILITIES THAT CURRENTLY RESIDE IN THE AWACS, JSTARS, AND OTHER AIRCRAFT. THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS COMMITTED TO AN UNMANNED AERIAL FORCE-BOTH FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND FOR ATTACK MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF ALL FOUR SERVICES. INDEED, THE AIR FORCE SHOULD BE MORE DEEPLY COMMITTED TO UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES THAN EVER BEFORE, HAVING INHERITED THE JUCAS PROGRAM FROM DARPA. A DECADE AGO UAV'S WERE STILL LITTLE MORE THAN A MINOR COMPONENT OF AMERICA'S FORCE POSTURE. TODAY, PARTICULARLY AFTER OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM AND ENDURING FREEDOM, THE JUCAS PROGRAM ALONE EXCEEDS $4 BILLION. THE ROLE OF UAV'S AND UCAV'S IS LIKELY TO GROW RATHER THAN DIMINISH IN THE YEARS AHEAD. LIKE THE AIR FORCE, THE NAVY CURRENTLY ONLY HAS ONE FIGHTER IN PRODUCTION, AND IS ANTICIPATING THE EMERGENCE OF THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER. UNLIKE THE AIR FORCE, HOWEVER, IT IS THE SHIPBUILDING BUDGET RATHER THAN THE FIGHTER BUDGET THAT APPEARS TO BE UNDER THE GREATEST PRESSURE. THE SIZE OF THE FLEET CONTINUES TO DECLINE, AS IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO REPLACE LARGE WARSHIPS ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS. WITH EVEN SMALLER WARSHIPS COSTING AT LEAST AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE MORE THAN A SINGLE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, THE PRESSURE ON THE FLEET RATHER THAN THE FIGHTER FORCE, CAN BE EXPECTED TO PERSIST FOR SOME TIME. THERE IS, HOWEVER, ONE INTERNAL BUDGET PRESSURE THAT THE AIR FORCE, NAVY, ARMY AND THE MARINES, ALL FACE IN COMMON. THE COSTS OF HEALTH CARE, OF OTHER PERSONNEL BENEFITS, AND OF PROVID Copyright © Lexington Institute. All rights reserved. |