AMMUNITION: DOES THE ARMY NEED A SECOND SOURCE?
Sep 15, 2005
Print Page
One of the most significant lessons from Hurricane Katrina is the
potential vulnerability of critical infrastructure and the consequences
of losing unique national assets. Gasoline prices rose 25% in a week
due to the shutdown of Gulf Coast refineries. The situation is rendered
even more dangerous when unique facilities are affected. For example,
there is growing concern that damage to the port of New Orleans will
result in billions of dollars of lost agricultural exports. There are
reports that the Ingalls shipyard at Pascagoula, Mississippi,
responsible for the production of Navy surface warships, will be
operating at reduced capacity for months to come.
The military
industrial base is one infrastructure sector that is particularly
vulnerable to such single-node failures. Most military equipment is
produced or assembled at a single facility. A natural disaster or
terrorist strike in one part of the homeland could negatively impact
U.S. national security on a global scale. In addition, because
successive administrations have refused to invest in surge
capabilities, most of these facilities lack the ability to rapidly
increase production in times of war.
One case in point is
small arms ammunition. The military relies on a single production
facility, the U.S. Army's Lake City Ammunition Plant, a
government-owned facility run by ATK. This is a terrific operation.
Lake City also is the exception to the rule that surge capability is
absent in the defense industrial base. After 9/11, as demand for small
caliber ammunition went through the roof, Lake City increased its
production from 300 million rounds a year to 1.2 billion. It is
prepared to increase that further to at least 1.5 billion rounds if
required.
The Army saw the need to enhance the ammunition
industrial base even further. It is moving towards a second source
producer of small arms ammunition. The second source will produce 300
million rounds per year with the possibility of an additional 200
million. The second source will be geographically separated from Lake
City. The Army envisioned the second source as a low risk supplement to
Lake City, one that would maximize U.S. content and have a demonstrated
capability in supply chain management. Together with the further
expansion of production at Lake City, the Army could purchase nearly 2
billion rounds of small arms ammunition a year. The Army's pursuit of a
second source for ammunition is a good example of acquisition reform.
The
value of a second source for ammunition geographically separated from
the primary production site should be obvious to everyone after
Katrina. A second source also provides some insurance against future
spikes in demand while simultaneously ensuring the viability of the
core industrial capability represented by Lake City.
Copyright ©
Lexington Institute. All rights reserved.
Printed From LexingtonInstitute.org on
http://lexingtoninstitute.org/printer_839.shtml
|
|