

EMPOWERING

A Strategy For Helping Allies
Share The Security Burden

PARTNERS



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today, the United States has the opportunity to create a new, more flexible, collaborative approach to the organization, management and support of friends and allies. The Obama Administration has put forth the idea of building partnership capacity in order to enable other countries to do more for themselves and rely less on the United States. This concept is evident in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review which articulates a policy of “building partnership capacity.” Likewise, the newly-released *National Security Strategy* states that to improve its own security, the United States work with others to be part of a collaborative effort to improve security for all.

It is time to take the concept of collective efforts on behalf of global security and stability to a new level. If friends and allies are going to take a large role in the management of our common security interests it is important that they have greater capability to provide for their own security and that of the regions in which they live. Correspondingly, the United States could take a lower profile, be more judicious in how it deploys military power in peacetime while still maintaining a forward presence and retaining the capacity to intervene decisively.

The U.S. is in a position to have enormous influence over the future security environments in regions of interest. It can exercise this influence and shape the security environment without having to expend historically high levels of resources or by maintaining large numbers of deployed forces. By seeking to work with friends and allies, the U.S. can create structures and processes that empower those states to maintain more in the way of critical self-defense capabilities. The U.S. can help develop new strategic architectures for regional security that also allow these friends and allies to collaborate more in regional security and improve their ability to operate with U.S. and Coalition forces in the event of conflict.

A key aspect of the new strategic architecture is providing the means whereby regional friends and allies are able to better deal with the potential for regional military imbalances and the possibility for large-scale aggression that, in some cases, could involve weapons of mass destruction. This could mean providing allies with advanced military equipment in such areas as integrated air and missile defenses, long-range ISR, local sea control and air superiority. The U.S. needs to develop a concerted strategy to provide our allies with additional advanced military capabilities to support their efforts to assume greater responsibility for their own security and that of the regions in which they reside.

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INTRODUCTION

By the late 1940s, as the Cold War became a reality and the United States focused in on a strategy of containing the Soviet Union, it became manifestly necessary for the West to create a series of formalized security relationships around the periphery of the Warsaw Pact. The largest, longest lasting and most comprehensive of these is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Over more than 60 years NATO has endured. At the same time it has continually transformed itself, responding to changes in the threat and circumstances.

The central pillar of the alliance is its commitment to collective defense. An attack on one is an attack on all. This is what distinguishes NATO as a multi-party alliance from all other existing security structures.

To credibly sustain the commitment to collective defense, NATO created unique features that both made it a strong and capable alliance and allowed it to respond to new demands, as necessary. In particular, NATO developed a series of structures, policies and procedures that allowed it to avoid many of the pitfalls common to multi-national alliances. The alliance also incorporated new arrangements to reflect changes in the international environment. In response to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO created the Partnership for Peace as a precursor to alliance expansion. The strength of NATO's institutions allowed it, in the words of some commentators, "to export security" to the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

In addition to NATO, the United States established formal collective defense treaty arrangements with South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Each of these bilateral treaties committed the respective parties to defend one

another. Each of these relationships included formal systems for the management of military forces as well as political consultations on security issues.

Collaboration with other countries has been a centerpiece of U.S. foreign and security policies for more than 70 years. However, this collaboration has virtually always been structured around formal security commitments or relationships. While formal alliance structures continue to have a place in U.S. foreign and security policies they no longer correspond accurately to the range of challenges faced by this country and like-minded friends and partners. Traditional alliances are in a process of change. Moreover, the United States is pursuing expanded security ties with nations such as India and Vietnam. In addition, friends and allies are expanding their range of interactions with each other independent of the United States, albeit with its knowledge and support.

Every administration speaks of the importance of alliances. The Obama Administration added the very smart idea of building partnership capacity in order to enable those countries to do more for themselves and rely less on the United States. However, the priority has generally been on less-capable nations fighting instability, insurgencies or terrorism. It is equally important -- one might even argue more important -- to build the capacity of our major friends and allies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. It is this community of free, mostly democratic nations that held the Soviet Union at bay and will oppose the rise of regional hegemony in the future. A strategic priority for this country should be improving the ability of friends and allies to defend themselves and our common interests.

Today, the United States has the opportunity to create a new, more flexible, collaborative approach to the organization, management



This Republic of Korea guided-missile destroyer and the USS Chosin guided-missile cruiser participated in the 2010 Rim of the Pacific multinational maritime exercise.

and support of friends and even allies. Absent agreement on the need for collective defense against a commonly recognized threat, the Cold War alliance structures have begun to fray. In addition, circumstances have changed, requiring even existing alliances to modify their structures, commitments and plans. The United States has established a framework for working with non-treaty allies and friends in the war against violent extremists. But the United States should consider how it will manage future security relationships with current major allies and new friends.

Such a new approach must be more flexible than Cold War structures. It would recognize and work from the reality that so-called “coalitions of the willing” are likely to be the norm in how nations respond to future security crises. As a consequence, the capabilities deployed by each specific coalition could vary greatly. Even current collective defense relationships may not be as robust in the future due to defense budget cuts by U.S. allies. This new approach also must take into account changes in national military structures and capabilities. The United States cannot take as a certainty that its major allies and future friends will be able to deploy a full range of military capabilities. In fact, given the complex

nature of future security challenges such as major humanitarian crises, it may make sense for some coalition partners to provide non-traditional and even non-military capabilities. However, the U.S. has the opportunity to work with allies and friends to assist them in developing their capabilities and in better rationalizing investments on a regional level.

Finally, it is clear that the U.S. military will face significant challenges in the future budget-constrained environment. As a result, it is more important than ever that the United States ensures that it has a broad set of capable friends and allies. The United States must take advantage of the current situation to empower friends and allies both to act in their own defense and as part of a coalition.

THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO THE FREE WORLD'S SECURITY

A central tenet of the newly-released 2010 U.S. *National Security Strategy* (NSS) is that to improve its own security, the United States work with others to be part of a collaborative effort to improve security for all.

The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will remain America's relations with our allies, and our commitment to their security is unshakable. These relationships must be constantly cultivated, not just because they are indispensable for U.S. interests and national security objectives, but because they are fundamental to our collective security. Alliances are force multipliers: through multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of our actions is always greater than if we act alone. We will continue to maintain the capacity to defend our allies against old and new threats. We will also continue to closely consult with our allies as well as newly emerging partners and organizations so that we revitalize and expand our cooperation to achieve common objectives. And we will continue to mutually benefit from the collective security provided by strong alliances.¹

Regarding NATO, for example, the NSS states, "We are committed to ensuring that NATO is able to address the full range of 21st century challenges, while serving as a foundation of European security." In other parts of the world, the NSS rededicates the United States to deepening and updating security relationships with old and trusted allies.

Similarly, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report states that "strong regional allies and partners are fundamental to meeting 21st century challenges successfully. Helping to build their capacity can prevent conflict

from beginning or escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces would be required." To this end, the QDR articulates a policy of "building partnership capacity."²

The NSS says that the United States will invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners. The idea is that our friends and allies want to and must be encouraged to do more for themselves, particularly when it comes to dealing with the challenges of stability, terrorism and insurgency. But the focus in the NSS and QDR clearly is on weak nations, those with problems of governance and institution building, economic development, political fragmentation, a history of violence and weak security capabilities.

While it is certainly important to help friends in need, particularly if their situation can give rise to broader conflicts or their territories serve as the base for global terrorism, this is only half the battle. What about all our other friends and allies, the countries that are not failing and which are able to manage their own security but on whom we need to rely more for managing regional and global security problems? Just because the NATO countries, Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, Australia and Japan are not in danger of failing does not mean the current administration doesn't need to spend time, effort and even resources helping to build their capacities. Equal attention should be given to enhancing the ability of major friends and allies, the NATO countries, Japan, South Korea and states in the Middle East to deal with the potential for regional military imbalances and the possibility for large-scale aggression that, in some cases, could involve weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has an opportunity to exercise its leadership position in the Free World by helping to develop a strategic architecture that shores up friends and allies confronting threats from regional instability and aspiring hegemon. Many of those friends and allies are desirous of a strategy, an architecture that will ensure their security in a time of uncertainty. A recent article by two analysts from the Center for European Policy Analysis³ points out that around the world there are a host of U.S. friends and allies “occupying strategic fault lines and in close proximity to a potential regional hegemon.” The authors argue that the United States needs a new approach to assisting friends and allies across the Free World, particularly in those areas that are most vulnerable and most difficult to defend.

Washington must develop a grand strategy for managing the global Allied periphery. Our most vulnerable strategic appendages are sure to come under increased Great Power scrutiny and probing in the years ahead. We must anticipate this opening act in the transition to a new geopolitical era and prepare for it. Whether that new era will be conflict-prone depends in part on how the U.S. responds to these early probes.

According to the authors of the aforementioned article, the United States must “pursue a ‘peripherist’ strategy aimed at visibly and preemptively driving up the costs of revisionism and geopolitical predation. We must hold the line -- not ham-fistedly, but with the steadiness of a self-assured status quo power whose alliances are sacrosanct, whose word is good, whose credibility is intact.”

One region where such a strategy is not only feasible but absolutely vital is East Asia. Over the past 60-plus years the United States has developed relationships and commitments with the major nations of the region from the

Republic of Korea, to Japan, Taiwan, Australia and Singapore. Taken together, they create a de facto alliance structure that stretches like a string of pearls across the expanse that is East Asia. This informal architecture on the periphery of the Asian mainland constitutes a powerful reservoir of military capability and a force for stability and peace in the region. Enhancing this set of relationships and empowering these allies to act more collaboratively in their own defense is an important U.S. security objective.

It is clear that U.S. allies around the world are hungry for a new security architecture that will respond to the demands of a difficult time. The proposal from a group of experts led by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for a NATO Strategic Concept (NATO 2020) may provide the basis for a new approach in the European region. The Strategic Concept envisions an alliance rededicated to its core mission of collective defense but also committed to expeditionary operations as necessary to meet the emerging threats of terrorism, piracy and cyber war. The new concept recognizes the reality that in a globalized security environment, collective defense cannot be accomplished on a regional basis. Security, like trade, must be pursued on a global basis. In order to achieve these goals, the panel report notes that NATO will have to transform and enhance its military capabilities.

NATO’s military and political commitments will mean little unless matched by capabilities. The Strategic Concept should include a clear statement of defense priorities and be accompanied by an agreed set of essential new or improved capabilities and reforms. NATO forces must have the capacity to defend alliance territory, undertake demanding missions at strategic distance, contribute to a more secure international environment and respond to unpredictable contingencies when and where that is required. Thus, there

is a continuing need to transform NATO forces from the powerful but static posture of the Cold War into a posture that is more flexible, mobile, and versatile.⁴

In addition, some members of the alliance, notably those in the East, perceive a need for NATO to take additional measures to reassure them that the capability exists to deter and if necessary defeat Russian aggression.⁵ This should not be surprising given Russia's new National Security Strategy which clearly identifies the United States and NATO as the principal threats.⁶ Providing such reassurance need not require major investments. Rather, target enhancements to logistics and sustainment, force deployment support and basing structures in the East could be sufficient.⁷



Collaborative weapons development programs such as the F-35 improve the technological prowess and military capabilities of all the participants.

Another reason to examine carefully the idea of a new strategic architecture for the Free World is the reality of growing pressures in many countries, including the United States, for deep cuts in defense spending. Some major U.S. allies have already announced significant reductions in defense spending as well as restructuring of their military forces. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed at a NATO gathering in 2010:

The demilitarization of Europe -- where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it -- has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st. Not only can real or perceived weakness be a temptation to miscalculation and aggression, but, on a more basic level, the resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared threats.⁸

To further complicate U.S. strategic planning, it is almost certain that U.S. defense spending will decline in the years to come, possibly significantly. The result will inevitably be reductions in force structure, including forward deployments. How could the Department of Defense take cuts without compromising U.S. global interests and security of key allies? A new relationship with friends and allies must be a major part of the answer.

There are historic precedents of nations deliberately setting out to recraft the architecture of their global security relationships.

For example, a century ago the world's global power, Great Britain, confronted with growing challenges around the world and a relative decline in its economic might, made a series of difficult choices designed to sustain its maritime superiority as best it could under increasingly difficult circumstances. Thus British leaders decided that the country would no longer seek to maintain a navy equal to the combined strength of the second and third largest navies (the "two-power standard") in the world. It also accepted what amounted to U.S. naval dominance in the Western Hemisphere and Japanese naval dominance in the Far East.

Thus did Great Britain accept limitations on its navy's ability to provide for its security. It also accepted greater risk in its ability to meet its reduced commitments by falling below the two-power standard when confronted with Germany's naval buildup.

To cover some of the growing gaps between the country's diminished resources relative to its rivals, Great Britain also cultivated alliances, both in name and in fact, effectively "outsourcing" to other states some of its security. The alliance with Japan helped to mitigate the Royal Navy's diminished presence in the Far East, and the entente with France enabled the British Admiralty to shift a substantial portion of its Mediterranean Fleet to home waters to address the growing German threat, leaving the French Navy to make up the shortfall.⁹

The challenge posed by pressure on defense budgets among the major Western allies should be seen as an opportunity for new thinking. Also, it is an opportunity to reassert the importance of collaborative action by like-minded nations both within and across regions. The United States shares common security interests with many countries. Even as resources for defense become tighter, by creating strategic architectures for regional security that capitalize on available capabilities and opportunities for national empowerment, the U.S., together with others, can still provide the security and stability the world craves.

It is time to take the concept of collective efforts on behalf of global security and stability to a new level. President Barack Obama has said repeatedly that the only hope for American security is to work with others, to be part of a collaborative effort to improve security for all. If friends and allies are going to take a large role in the management of our common security interests it is important that they have greater

capability to provide for their own security, that of the regions in which they live and, at least in some instances, neighboring regions. Correspondingly, the United States could take a lower profile, be more judicious in how it deploys military power in peacetime while still maintaining a forward presence and retaining the capacity to intervene decisively, as needed.



The Littoral Combat Ship is likely to be an attractive system to U.S. friends and allies.

What is required is a strategy that empowers collaborative defense. The centerpiece of this approach would be to seek out ways that enable our friends and allies to do more for themselves, to better integrate our forces and theirs, to contribute more to regional deterrence and to lower the burden and footprint for the United States. At the same time, these friends and allies can help establish the best roles for the United States in assisting friends and allies.

One of the most important lessons not only of the Cold War but of the new conflicts beginning in the late 20th century is the value of collective military capabilities. NATO is the archetype of the way to pursue collaborative defense. First, there was the integrated military command structure. Second, there was the willingness of each member to contribute available military capabilities to the collective effort. Third, there

was the ongoing program to improve the interoperability of national forces. Based on its preparation and experience NATO members were able to participate alongside U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf War and provide a collective response to the threat posed by the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Empowerment was key to the way NATO operated; everybody brought what they had to the party but there were ongoing efforts to develop collective capabilities and to set minimum standards for national contributions.

Empowering collaborative defense will be critical to maintaining regional deterrence. Where adequate self-defense capabilities exist, friends and allies will be more likely to resist intimidation and to join with the United States in deterring aggression. We are already seeing a version of this concept being employed in the Middle East with the expansion of air and missile defense systems among U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf. Deterrence is enhanced both by the presence of new and powerful defensive systems in the region and by the close connection between regional military capabilities and U.S. global military posture.

The United States will need to take the lead in creating a new strategic architecture based on empowering collaborative defense. The same energy and effort that have gone into the plans for building partnership capacity to combat terrorism must be devoted to developing tailored regional strategies for enhancing the capabilities of friends and allies in key parts of the world. These strategies need to be integrated with plans to revise the U.S. military's global posture, future procurement strategies and policies with respect to international arms sales. The result of such an effort could be a new, more equitable balance of capabilities and responsibilities between the United States and its friends and allies in Europe, the Middle

East and East Asia, one that reflects the security and fiscal realities of the new century.

At last year's International Institute for Strategic Studies' Asia Security Summit, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described how a new security architecture is being built in that part of the world.

What we have seen in the U.S. approach to Asia in recent years -- and what I believe we will see in the future -- is a very real shift that reflects new thinking in U.S. defense strategy overall. A shift that, while continuing to fulfill our commitments to the permanent presence of, and direct action by, U.S. forces in the region -- places ever greater emphasis on building the capacity of partners to better defend themselves.¹⁰

Without question the United States will remain a great power, possibly even the most powerful country in the world. But both as a necessity and as a matter of good policy, it is important that our friends and allies take a greater role in providing for their own security and that of the regions in which they live. Correspondingly, the United States will take a lower profile, provide less in the way of immediate military capability but have the capacity to intervene decisively, as needed.

TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURE FOR COLLABORATIVE DEFENSE

The Obama Administration's vision of a more collaborative world order would be well served by defining a new global security architecture, one in which the United States is not the hub around which the wheel of common security revolves but rather a partner with others. Such an architecture would define expanded collaborative approaches to security within and even across regions, and specify the additional defensive capabilities that would be required. Equal attention needs to be given to enhancing the ability of major friends and allies, the NATO countries, Japan, South Korea and states in the Middle East, to deal with potential regional military imbalances and the possibility of large-scale aggression that, in some cases, could involve weapons of mass destruction.

Empowering collaborative defense must start with the recognition that the United States will be more dependent in the future than in the past on those friends and allies to maintain regional deterrence and act as the first line of defense in the event of aggression. The key to stable regional deterrence is a favorable balance of forces. The Department of Defense should undertake net military assessments of each key region, identify critical capability gaps and seek ways of providing those capabilities to friends and allies. These friends and allies need to have the best equipment available, preferably U.S. systems to ensure interoperability and allow us to provide key enablers. The United States must still have forces forward deployed and maintain its commitment to the security of friends and allies. What must change is the way we provide for their security.

These strategies need to be integrated with plans to revise the U.S. military's global posture, future procurement strategies and

policies with respect to international arms sales. The result could be a more equitable balance of capabilities and responsibilities between the United States and its friends and allies in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, one that reflects the security and fiscal realities of the new century.



The Global Hawk was chosen as part of the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program.

Robust regional deterrence requires new and expanded conventional offensive capabilities. Precision strike systems are the key to U.S. conventional preeminence. The administration should consider expanded sales of U.S. systems such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition, Small Diameter Bomb, Joint Stand-Off Weapon and the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile to allies as part of the program. Also, the United States must examine what can be done to improve allied capabilities for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to support precision strike.

Finally, robust conventional deterrence means improved capabilities to deal with chemical and biological threats. This is the weakest area in the administration's 2010 *Nuclear Posture*

Review. Despite its claims to the contrary, the United States has made relatively little progress in dealing with either chemical or biological threats. Some allies have better capabilities than U.S. forces. A major collaborative program is required in the detection, characterization and neutralization of chemical/biological attacks.

The United States should welcome NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen's effort to invigorate the Euro-Atlantic security architecture by pursuing a comprehensive missile defense system. The United States has proposed deploying theater missile defenses based on its proven Aegis ballistic missile defense system in Southeast Europe. Such a system would serve as a key piece of what the United States conceives of as a tailored, regional deterrent. The same argument Secretary-General Rasmussen is making on behalf of Europe can be applied to the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia.¹¹

More important, regional missile defense shields could serve as a pillar of a new U.S.-led global security architecture. Such an architecture would be based on a solid core of advanced military capabilities in areas such as integrated air and missile defense, ISR, local sea control and precision strike in the hands of U.S. allies. The model of a comprehensive European missile defense could be extended to the Persian Gulf region where U.S. allies are acquiring Patriot Advanced Capability 3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems, and Northeast Asia where the United States and Japan are co-developing the advanced Standard Missile 3 Block IIB missile interceptor. For its part, the United States would both serve as a source of these advanced military systems and provide critical enablers such as long-range sensors, mobile defenses and space control.



Weapons development programs such as the Standard Missile improve the military capabilities of our allies. Pictured here, a Japanese destroyer launches a Standard Missile 3.

Equally important, sources have warned that the United States does not expect to deploy sufficient missile defense capabilities to cover all potential threats. This is one reason for the emphasis on mobile capabilities. Another way of addressing the problem of high-demand/low-density capabilities is to place greater reliance on friends and allies. By providing friends and allies with the missile defenses they seek, the United States may be able to enhance regional security while reducing its own defense burdens. This approach is the essence of the concept of empowering collaborative defense.

EMPOWERMENT OF REGIONAL SELF-DEFENSE

While NATO stands apart in terms of the breadth of the alliance and its commitment to collective defense, the United States maintains strong security ties with many nations. With some, such as Japan, there is a treaty-based security relationship. Under this treaty both Japan and the United States assumed an obligation to maintain and develop their capacities to resist armed attack in common and to assist each other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese administration.¹² In other cases, the relationships are not formalized or are less extensive in the sense that there is no formal commitment to collective defense.

Traditionally, the United States has treated its regional security relationships as if they existed in isolation. After September 11, 2001, this habit was broken with NATO's decision to invoke Article V and to deploy military forces to Afghanistan. Since then, it has become clear that in building security structures and bilateral relationships at the regional level, the United States must also consider how activities in one region can affect others and, more important, how working to empower collaborative defenses can be effected inter-regionally. Air and missile defenses do not easily conform to regional boundaries, particularly when the concern is missiles launched from one region aimed at targets in another. The same is true of securing the global commons.

In order to work effectively with major allies and ensure they are provided with the means they need for self-defense and regional collaboration, the United States needs to think strategically. This means asking some important basic questions. What critical capabilities do these allies have and what more do they need? What is needed in the way of agreements, procedures, tactics and systems to enable greater collaboration among allies and with the United States? What

can be done to improve interoperability such as has been achieved among the NATO countries? Even if we keep the answers to ourselves, this is the basis for establishing priorities in export control reforms, future foreign arms sales, collaborative international weapons programs and military-to-military contacts.

The United States and Europe

The "Albright" proposals acknowledge but fail to resolve NATO's greatest strategic problem, which is the disparity between demands for capabilities and the willingness of most members to devote an adequate share of national resources to defense. The reality is that the military capabilities of the majority of NATO countries have been in a state of secular decline for almost two decades. While initial defense reductions following the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War made sense, NATO Europe has continued to see its defenses decline as defense budgets are reduced. As far back as NATO's Balkan campaigns of the 1990s it was clearly recognized that the forces provided by many NATO members were of limited utility precisely because they lacked precision strike capabilities, all-weather/day-night strike aircraft, airborne ground surveillance, stealth, and tactical airlift.¹³

Recognizing the need to improve its capabilities, in 1999 NATO formulated the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). This was intended both to improve NATO's ability to fulfill its traditional Article V commitments, and prepare the alliance to meet emerging security needs. DCI aimed to improve NATO core capabilities by listing 59 "action items" in five categories: mobility and deployability; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability; and consultation, command and control.¹⁴ However, DCI failed because it required participating countries to increase their defense spending, which most did not do.

In 2002 NATO formulated the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), a scaled-down version of the DCI. The PCC identified eight specific capabilities areas where significant additional investment was required: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control, and communications; combat effectiveness; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.¹⁵

U.S. allies continue to spend less on defense with the result that they are less capable of providing for their own defense or securing their region. Great Britain, America's closest European ally, has seen its defense spending decline to levels -- in GDP terms -- not seen since the 1930s. As a result, major weapons programs have been truncated and the size of the British military has been reduced. Over the past five years, the number of Army combat units has shrunk by eight combat battalions, the Royal Air Force by five tactical fighter squadrons and the Navy by more than 25 ships. At the same time, demands on this downsized force have grown creating stress on personnel and wear and tear on equipment.¹⁶

The new British government's strategic defense review made substantial additional cuts in the size of that country's military. While retaining a core capability in land, air and sea warfare, the United Kingdom limited its ability to operate independently in the world. Although it may still be able to "punch above its weight" it no longer will be able to project or sustain military power in distant regions without operating in a coalition.

Germany has seen its armed forces shrink by nearly half, with a corresponding reduction in capabilities for high-intensity ground combat. The Bundeswehr has been working to convert its military into a more expeditionary force.

However, with the second largest military in NATO, Germany continues to spend less than 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. As a result, it has made limited improvements in most of the areas defined in the PCC. Moreover, sustainment of combat forces has lagged far behind other investments.

France too is deep into the process of restructuring its military. It has reduced heavy forces in order to ensure that the remainder is more capable of being deployed. It has sought to modernize residual mobile capabilities to make them more capable of expeditionary operations. France is also reorienting its military deployments towards greater involvement in areas of emerging interest such as the Persian Gulf.

In addition, France is giving new support to collaborative defense activities, not only in Europe but abroad. The French Government has rejoined NATO's integrated command structure, allowing it to plan and train with other NATO forces for alliance operations. The deployment of some 3,000 French soldiers and marines to Afghanistan is a clear example of the new French approach to coalition operations.

France and the United Kingdom have come to the conclusion that closer defense collaboration must be pursued in this era of defense belt tightening. In an historic agreement, these two nations signed a treaty which would have units from the two nations fighting side by side. In addition, this agreement would focus on collaborative efforts on joint training, cooperation on acquiring equipment and technology, making military equipment more compatible, and greater information-sharing.

Other NATO members such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy have downsized their military establishments and shed heavy warfighting capabilities. Combat forces have been made lighter and more expeditionary; air

units have been shifted from air-to-air combat to ground defense. What are still lacking are the supporting capabilities in intelligence, transportation, communications and logistics to sustain these forces in out-of-area operations. Moreover, the reduction in the size of overall military establishments limits both the size of the forces that can be deployed and the rotational base that sustains them.

National decisions to reduce defense expenditures and cut military capabilities could have consequences for the cohesion of European countries on security issues. According to Markus Kaim of the German Institute of International Security Affairs, "with all the cutbacks taking place in Europe because of the recent global financial crisis you see a re-nationalization of defense and security policy across much of Europe. What will that do for more coordination among EU [*European Union*] countries?"¹⁷

The United States has accepted the possibility that there could be certain security problems that Europe would choose to address through the European Union rather than NATO. One reason for pressing ahead with a strategy based on empowerment is to help Europe develop some capacity for independent action. The question is whether near-term cuts to national defense budgets will undermine any realistic prospects for the European Union -- and by extension NATO Europe as a whole -- to be able to provide for its own security.

It is time for the alliance to begin to consider ways of expanding existing collaborative defense programs. NATO's secretary-general recently called on that alliance to invest in a European-wide, integrated missile defense capability. "Missile defense," he asserted, "might be one key area whereby the Europeans can demonstrate such a commitment (to their own security) ... and also demonstrate to the American public that the alliance is relevant."¹⁸

A U.S.-led effort in NATO to bring together the different capabilities available to the alliance could create a strong defensive structure. One study of NATO missile defense potentials noted that:

In principle, European contributions to NATO missile defense can consist of interceptors, sensors, communications links, headquarters and other elements of an integrated missile defense system. Any such contribution could be made in three ways, through: 1) Capabilities that are already in or planned for service in national forces; 2) Additional national capabilities procured specifically to support the new NATO posture and that would be integrated into the NATO system, and; 3) New, cooperative programs for the acquisition and operation of multi-national capabilities. While European alliance members will likely pursue all three options, the technical and financial difficulty of individual countries operating some of the available missile defense interceptors suggests that the third, multinational option will be of particular importance.¹⁹

As the United States moves forward with plans for a phased adaptive defense in Europe it would be wise to develop an approach that integrates the capabilities of allied nations. Equally important would be the creation of an integrated air and missile defense capability to address the emerging threat posed by cruise missiles and armed unmanned aerial vehicles.

Fortunately, the creation of a new strategic architecture for Europe does not start from scratch as it would in other regions. NATO has many of the critical elements of a truly collaborative system. Most important, there is a history of consultation and cooperation. There is the integrated command structure. There is the experience of the alliance pooling funds

for common projects such as NATO Airborne Warning and Control System. The alliance has had some significant success creating common standards, protocols and procedures.

In addition, many U.S. allies and friends have security interests and historic relationships that extend well beyond their own regions. NATO has clearly demonstrated its collective interest for stability in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa. The United Kingdom and France have long-standing security relationships with nations around the world. Turkey has been deeply involved in promoting stability in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Australia's security horizon extends well beyond Southeast Asia.

In considering a new strategic architecture that supports empowerment of friends and allies, the United States needs to work closely with other nations who share its concerns regarding regional security in places such as the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Northeast Asia. The U.S. should seek ways of enhancing collaboration with and among longtime allies in Europe and Asia as it defines security architecture for other regions of interest.

The United States and the Middle East and Persian Gulf

The United States has long viewed the Middle East, and especially the Persian Gulf, as a region of vital U.S. national interest. Despite decades of involvement in this region, there is no overall U.S. construct or framework that defines the desired balance of forces in the region, the operational requirements the U.S would like to see its friends and allies attain or the priority order in addressing shortfalls.

The George W. Bush Administration initiated an effort in 2006 to revive security cooperation between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) under the auspices of the Gulf Security Dialogue. The core

objectives of the Dialogue are the promotion of intra-GCC and GCC-U.S. cooperation to meet common perceived threats. The first objective of the Global Security Dialogue is the improvement of GCC defense capabilities and interoperability.

After terrorism, the dominant security problem in the region is Iran. The growing power of Iran and its investment in anti-access/area-denial capabilities such as ballistic missiles has engendered a profound sense of insecurity among the other states of the Persian Gulf region. As a result, they have gone on something of a buying spree seeking to acquire improved means to defend themselves. For example, the administration recently approved a major arms sale to Saudi Arabia. The proposed sale includes 84 new Boeing F-15s, the refurbishment of 70



The aircraft carrier USS George Washington and the Republic of Korea Navy Aegis destroyer Sejong the Great are underway in the Yellow Sea during a bilateral exercise.

F-15s already sold to Saudi Arabia, 72 new UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters and advanced targeting systems. Along with recent sales of F-16 fighters and Patriot and THAAD missile defense systems to several other Gulf countries, the Saudi sale will substantially tilt the balance of military power in the region against Iran. Egypt, one of the largest recipients of U.S. military aid has recently signed a number

of deals with the United States for the purchase of, inter alia, F-16s, fast-attack missile ships, Harpoon launchers and Hellfire missiles. These decisions, along with additional purchases of advanced weapons from other countries such as Great Britain and France, provide U.S. allies with an enormous potential capability to secure themselves against Iranian aggression.

According to Secretary Gates:

The more that our Arab friends and allies can strengthen their security capabilities, the more they can strengthen their cooperation, both with each other and with us. I think this sends the signal to the Iranians that the path they are on is not going to advance Iranian security, but in fact could weaken it.²⁰

However, the Gulf States have not tied together their capabilities, particularly in the most critical areas; air defense and protection of offshore installations and the sea lanes of communications. In his speech to the Gulf Manama Dialogue in 2008, Secretary Gates made a strong case for the GCC countries extending their cooperation in air and maritime defenses, “areas where multi-national cooperation is not just a preference, but a necessity.” Gates went on to make a similar argument for expanded maritime cooperation.²¹ However, as experts on the region have noted, the GCC has not done enough to turn good intentions into practical actions.

In practice, the GCC remains a facade rather than a force. It lacks effective unity of effort in war fighting, deterrent, and force development terms. It has proposed a wide range of useful projects to improve military interoperability and cooperation since its founding in 1980, but its members have made only limited progress.²²

Clearly, there is a role for the United States beyond merely that of arms merchant. What is needed is the development of a regional security system based on the existing dialogue among the Gulf States and their individual defense plans. In order for a regional security architecture to be credible and effective, the United States’ role must be one largely limited to support and encouragement. But support can take many forms including bilateral and multilateral exercises, training and education, and the provision of critical intelligence information.

Elsewhere in the region, the United States possesses longstanding, close security relationships with a number of states, most notably Israel, Egypt, Turkey and Morocco. These countries serve as anchors for regional stability. For decades the United States has been the principal security guarantor for these countries as well as their primary source of foreign military hardware. To date, these nations have served as a bulwark against extremism in the region. Although at times quite tense, the Egyptian-Israeli relationship serves as a benchmark for what successive U.S. administrations have sought in the way of a relationship between Israel and its neighbors.

The United States should consider pursuing a strategic architecture for the Persian Gulf that would explicitly link together the efforts by the states of that area to provide integrated air and missile defense, sea control for the Gulf and regional ISR. This capability could at some point be extended more broadly to the Middle East. Iran’s missile force poses a threat not only to its nearer neighbors but to Israel, Turkey and beyond. Integrating these capabilities into a broader Middle East missile defense network could be valuable. One role for the United States in such a system would be to support integrated air and missile defenses with additional early warning and attack characterization information.

The United States and East Asia

The balance of economic power in the world is shifting inexorably to the East. The clearest measure of this is the growing economies of China, India and the nations of East and Southeast Asia. The preponderance of military power in the world also may be shifting eastward, or at least to the Western Pacific and the nations along its shores. The impact of these changes on the international environment and security in the region are already profound. They cry out for new approaches to regional security. With respect to the United States, the desire to balance its economic and security interests in the region would appear to necessitate a new strategic approach to the region and the creation of a new architecture.

There is growing concern about the stability of the most important deterrence relationships in East Asia: those vis-à-vis North Korea and the People's Republic of China. As a result, the governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and even Vietnam have sought to strengthen their security ties with the United States. Recent events have underscored the fragility of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the critical role played by the United States in preventing conflict there. The ROK has requested that the planned hand-over of command for all forces on the Korean Peninsula, scheduled for 2011 be delayed until 2014.

The growth in China's military power has continued unabated for more than 20 years. While not yet militarily dominant in East Asia, the Chinese military is well on its way to posing a serious strategic challenge to its neighbors and the United States.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-

duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries -- an approach that China refers to as preparing for "local wars under conditions of informatization." The pace and scope of China's military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces. China's ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited, but its armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region.²³

It is time the United States developed a long-term strategy for the inevitable military competition with China. Competition does not mean conflict. It means addressing those aspects of the rise of China that could potentially lead to conflict. China is competing with the United States so it seems reasonable that this country do the same.

The competition with China is as much military as it is economic. Beijing is developing a precision-guided ballistic missile theoretically capable of attacking U.S. aircraft carriers. China is building more new classes of submarines than the entire Western world combined. According to Secretary Gates, China's cyber and anti-access capabilities pose a clear threat to the ability of the United States to operate from forward military bases in East Asia. Not long ago, Chinese warships threatened a U.S. intelligence vessel conducting routine collection operations in the South China Sea, forcing this country to send a destroyer to protect our ship.

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recently conducted complex military operations in the South China Sea. These exercises involved coordinated attacks on "surface targets" using groups of aircraft, missile-firing ships and land-launched missiles. The message is clear: China wants to dominate the waters that touch East Asia and exclude the United States from them.

How should the United States respond? With its own strategy for competition. One aspect of such a strategy is to exploit enduring U.S. advantages, the most significant of which is its alliance relationships throughout the region. In East Asia, the United States created a web of security relationships based on a series of bilateral agreements with nations in the region. The most important security relationships are with Japan, the ROK, Australia and Taiwan. The economic and military power of these nations taken together with that of the United States can more than offset the growth of China's capabilities and resources. Even Chinese observers see the power in a security structure based on the alliances the U.S. has built in the region. Addressing U.S. involvement in the recent confrontation with China over the South China Sea, an official Chinese news organization opined that:

The U.S. power play caters to the fact that China's neighboring countries are on guard against its growing influence ... The U.S. is returning to Southeast Asia with a clear political agenda. It is trying to expand U.S. influence and strengthen cooperation with countries in the region, but seeds of distrust are also being planted with its attempt to contain China.²⁴

In his speech to the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue, Secretary Gates made a forceful case for the continuing importance of the set of alliance relationships the United States maintains in the region.

Simply put, pursuing our common interests has increased our common security. Today, the Asia-Pacific region is contending with new and evolving challenges, from rising powers and failing states, to the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missiles, extremist violence, and new technologies that have the ability to disrupt the foundations of trade and commerce on which Asia's economic stability depends. Confronting these threats is not the task of any one nation acting alone. . . .(A)ll of us have responsibilities we must fulfill, since all will bear the costs of instability as well as the rewards of international cooperation.²⁵

Secretary Gates went on to emphasize the role of U.S. allies in securing the global commons and, in particular, the maritime domain. Building the capacity of U.S. partners to better protect and defend the maritime routes that link East Asian nations with one another and the region with the rest of the world is part of the U.S. defense strategy.

Another aspect of maritime security -- and the overall U.S. defense strategy in this region -- is building partner capacity. After all, shared responsibilities for security in Asia require, as a starting point, that individual nations have the ability to contribute in the first place -- that they possess the means not only to secure their own territories, but also to export security abroad. As our partners develop new capabilities, they have a responsibility to take a greater role in providing for regional and global security. Whether in the Gulf of Aden, or in Iraq, or in Afghanistan, the nations of Asia are making vital contributions to international operations.²⁶

The United States would benefit from re-orienting its Cold War-based alliance structures in Asia toward a new architecture designed to manage the growing power of Asia, prevent the rise of a regional hegemon and reduce the risk of conflict. It must more closely integrate its relationships with its allies and allow those countries to more actively collaborate amongst themselves. Finally, the United States needs to maintain sufficient military power in the region to deny any aggressor the ability to use military force rapidly and at low cost to subjugate another state in the region.

A strategic architecture that focuses on empowering collaborative defense should emphasize assisting regional friends and allies to improve their individual and collective capabilities in a number of critical areas. Most of these are important to the defense of the global commons, a mission called out by the 2010 QDR and obviously of importance to U.S. friends and allies in East Asia. The first area which would be enhanced by greater collaborative activity is long-range ISR. This would also involve greater sharing of intelligence. The second is integrated air and missile defense. The third is anti-submarine warfare. Yet another is electronic and cyber warfare. In each of these areas, collaborative efforts have the potential to provide greater security than the mere sum of the individual, national contributions.

The United States and South Asia

In contrast to its relationship with Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, the United States has relatively few long-standing security ties with the nations of South Asia. Its relationship with India has often been difficult. Yet, there are clear opportunities for improved relations with the nations of South Asia in general, and India in particular.

What should be the basis for the creation of a security architecture in South Asia? The primary focus of security relations between the United States and the nations of South Asia must be on combating terrorism. Second to this should be preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The third is to enhance the ability of the states of the region and principally India to provide for its own defense, the security of adjacent airspace and seaways, and to collaborate better in these endeavors with the United States.

At present there does not appear to be the possibility or the necessity of creating a formalized security structure with India such as the United States enjoys with NATO countries, the ROK, Japan and Australia. But it is not certain that such a close relationship is warranted. What clearly is desirable is a close working relationship between the Indian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense and continuing military-to-military contacts. Expanded sales of U.S. military equipment such as F-16 and F-18 fighters, C-17s and P-8s to India would empower Indian self-defense and help build collaborative working relationships between the Indian Air Force and Navy and their counterparts in the U.S. Similarly, the sale of Stryker armored vehicles to India would serve as a starting point for collaboration between the U.S. Army and the Indian Army.

A new security architecture for South Asia also must develop inter-regional cooperation. For example, the annual Malabar naval exercises between the United States and India have in recent years included ships from Japan, Australia and Singapore. The 2009 Malabar exercises not only included Japanese ships but were conducted off the coast of Okinawa. Regional and inter-regional exercises are certain to be a major component of a new security architecture.

EMPOWERMENT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION

The U.S. military is increasingly dependent on a global defense industrial base. It is no longer possible for any nation to meet all its defense requirements solely from domestic sources. This is not just a matter of quantity but also of quality. Major international defense companies including BAE Systems, Finmeccanica/DRS, Thales and EADS provide vital support to the U.S. military. Many of these companies have sent their own personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan where they provide critical support to deployed U.S. and Coalition forces.



The Stryker combat vehicle has the potential for large international sales.

It is as important to capitalize on the strength of the array of major defense companies as it is to enhance the defense collaboration with and among U.S. allies. In part, getting the most from foreign defense companies requires a level playing field in competitive contract activities. It also means simplifying and clarifying technology transfer regulations so as to allow multinational companies -- a category which includes virtually all of the major U.S. firms -- to operate effectively and provide the Department of Defense best value. Collaborative weapons development programs such as the F-35,

the Medium Extended Air Defense System and the Standard Missile (SM-3) improve the technological prowess and military capabilities of all the participants.

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have also highlighted the value to the United States and the Coalition of support from foreign non-defense companies. The ability of the U.S. military to support and sustain its forces in Afghanistan relies almost totally on private logistics suppliers such as Maersk Line, Limited, and APL. The military's movement of packages and materiel both within the United States and, more importantly, to bases and locations around the world relies on private carriers such as UPS, C.H. Robinson and DHL.

A new strategic architecture for collaborative defense would pay serious attention to the role of international arms programs and the potential benefits from cooperation between defense companies. In addition, such an architecture should seek to identify regions and functions where non-traditional defense companies can contribute to enhancing regional security. International companies often have capabilities, facilities and personnel in locations of interest to the U.S. military and its allies. These companies may be able to support shaping operations, enhance humanitarian responses and support a wide range of traditional military missions.

Over the past 50 years, the United States has provided critical capabilities to dozens of friends and allies. Since 1978, the United States has sold more than a thousand F-16s to 24 countries, the largest single international arms program in history. Together with sales of F/A-18s and F-15s, the United States provides the Free World with the means to defend its air

space. The United States also enabled a global ground-based air defense capability, first with the sale of tens of thousands of Hawk missiles and for the past 30 years by selling allies the Patriot air and missile defense system. Some 67 countries have acquired various models of the C-130 airlifter, enabling them to provide logistics support to military forces and humanitarian assistance in the event of natural disasters. The United States provided the M-60 main battle tank to numerous friends and allies while M-1 Abrams tanks have gone to such critical allies as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and now Iraq.

A strategic appreciation of the role of U.S. arms sales in empowering self-defense will recognize the value of having friends and allies operate the same equipment as that of the U.S. military. NATO's performance in operations in the Balkans and the Middle East was clearly improved when common capabilities were available. When nations possess the same weapons systems they can establish close bonds through training activities, exercises and logistics and sustainment efforts.

One example of the power of U.S. collaboration is the F-16 program. With around 4,000 aircraft produced, this is the single largest military aircraft program in history. The 24 countries that fly the F-16 reflect the full array of U.S. global relationships: Bahrain, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Jordan, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. During the Cold War, the fleets of F-16s deployed by allies in Europe and Northeast Asia helped to deter the Soviet Union. Recent sales of advanced F-16 variants are helping to keep the peace and augment the deployment of U.S. airpower overseas.

International arms sales can enhance regional stability. The United States provided the means to completely re-equip the Egyptian military in the aftermath of the peace treaty between that country and Israel. Sales to Saudi Arabia and the states of the Persian Gulf helped to offset the military threats posed first by Iraq, and now by Iran. The sale of conventional arms is one tool by which the United States has sought to counter the temptation that some states might have to pursue weapons of mass destruction.

International sales of the next generation of U.S. weapons systems clearly has the potential to enhance the security of friends and allies and support a number of U.S. foreign policy and security objectives. The F-35 consortium, consisting of Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway, is the most far-reaching international arms cooperation arrangement ever. Over the next several decades, sales of the F-35 could exceed those of the F-16. U.S. allies



New UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters are included in the proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia.

have acquired the C-17 to fill the capabilities gap created by the long-delayed A400M. Systems such as the Stryker combat vehicle, Littoral Combat Ship, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, Predator and Global Hawk

unmanned aerial systems and the V-22 among others are likely to be very attractive to friends and allies.

Foreign military sales, properly structured, can also provide benefits for the U.S. military in the form of reduced costs for equipment. In the late 1980s, the U.S. production of the M1A1 Abrams tank was coming to an end. There was no money to develop an advanced version, the A2. Foreign sales sustained the program. First, the United States entered into a long-term arrangement with Egypt for the co-production of M1s. Throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s Egypt bought additional M1s. In addition, Saudi Arabia bought 315 M1s. Without active production there was the real possibility that key production personnel would lose their jobs. Instead, the foreign sales provided sufficient additional funds to allow the Army to proceed with development of the M1A2.



A Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16AM Fighting Falcon aircraft taxis toward the end of the runway.

Another example is the sale of Patriot missiles to several allies. The United Arab Emirates bought 10 Patriot Fire Units and 530 Patriot missiles. This sale allowed the fixed costs associated with the program to be spread over a large production run lowering the costs to all those acquiring the system including the U.S. Army. As a result, the United States saved

the equivalent of a battery of Patriots worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

There are a number of U.S. weapons programs that today are sustained solely by foreign sales. These include the F-15 and F-16 fighters. Without additional sales to foreign countries, these two major platforms will go out of production in a few years. Many other systems that were once in the U.S. inventory but are now deployed solely with foreign forces still receive maintenance and sustainment support through the U.S. military depot system.

The creation of a strategic architecture to empower collaborative defense by the United States and its allies requires thinking about the various elements of U.S. relations with those nations in a holistic sense. In essence, this is a “whole of alliances” approach. While each bilateral relationship is different and the needs and circumstances in each region unique, there should be a set of guiding principles and common objectives across regions. In addition, the proposed architecture must empower allies not merely to defend themselves but to contribute to the ability of all like-minded states in a region to support one another thereby creating a defensive capability greater than the sum of its parts. The proposed architecture also would seek to harmonize a number of U.S. defense policies from forward deployments and global basing to arms sales and technology transfer.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE

The U.S. is in a position to have enormous influence over the future security environments in regions of interest. Moreover, it can exercise this influence and shape the security environment without having to expend historically high levels of resources or by maintaining large numbers of deployed forces. By seeking to work with friends and allies, the U.S. can create structures and processes that empower those states to maintain more in the way of critical self-defense capabilities. The U.S. can help develop new strategic architectures for regional security that also allow these friends and allies to collaborate more in regional security and improve their ability to operate with U.S. and Coalition forces in the event of conflict.

There are a number of steps that need to be taken to create the proposed global architecture to support empowered collaborative defense. The United States should start by assessing the evolving security environments on a region by region basis. For each region a stable military balance must be defined. This balance needs to consider the current and future capabilities of U.S. allies and the U.S. global force posture in comparison to capabilities that potential aggressors possess or may be able to acquire. Based on this “net assessment,” a set of critical capabilities gaps will emerge. Filling these gaps will be the primary goal of the effort to empower collaborative defense. The new architecture should consider how regional capabilities may overlap or be mutually reinforcing. This is clearly the case for integrated air and missile defenses. In addition, the new architecture must address the role of mobile or deployable U.S. capabilities that can be “swung” to address specific regional crises.

A key aspect of the new strategic architecture is providing the means whereby regional friends

and allies are able to better deal with the potential for regional military imbalances and the possibility for large-scale aggression that, in some cases, could involve weapons of mass destruction. This could mean providing allies with advanced military equipment in such areas as integrated air and missile defenses, long-range ISR, local sea control and air superiority. The United States has done this to a limited degree, as in the international partnership for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. But this is only one example of what should be a concerted strategy to provide our allies with additional advanced military capabilities to support their efforts to assume greater responsibility for their own security and that of the regions in which they reside.

The United States must think how it might alter its force posture as well as its foreign military sales to better ensure a sensible distribution of capabilities to support the new architecture of collaborative self-defense. For example, what about creating a mobile missile defense force based on the current sea-based but future land-based, transportable Aegis/Standard Missile 3 configuration currently planned for limited deployment in Europe? This force would be deployed as needed, based on prior negotiations and planning conducted with U.S. regional allies. In fact, one such grouping could be deployed in each critical region. NATO could even pay for and man its own mobile theater missile defense force, leaving the United States to address threats elsewhere. Or there could be a sharing of the costs to support critical capabilities, something that Europe is already attempting to do in a select number of areas such as theater lift.

Essential to the development of a new strategic architecture is the revamping of U.S. export controls. In his speech announcing

proposed export control reforms, Secretary Gates asserted that all the institutional changes he is pursuing were “to one degree or another aimed at improving the way the United States works with and through other countries to confront shared security challenges.”²⁷ Secretary Gates used the example of a British-owned C-17 disabled in Australia that could not be repaired for many hours because the government in London first had to obtain a license to make the needed repair. So draconian are the rules that they have crippled the ability of U.S. satellite makers to compete in the commercial marketplace. The result has been the loss of foreign sales, a shrinking of the U.S. satellite industrial base, the expansion of foreign makers of these systems and less control over sensitive satellite technologies.

The current system requires an export license for commonly available items associated with military systems such as spare tires, batteries and electric generators. The practical aspects of the Secretary’s proposal, a single agency responsible for licensing and enforcement, with one all-encompassing list of controlled items (right now there are several lists that are the responsibility of different agencies) and a unified information system for tracking license requests and licensed items, makes eminent sense. A simpler process, one with fewer steps, less bureaucracy and greater clarity, would be an obvious improvement.

Equally important are the strategic aspects of the Secretary’s proposal. If the United States is going to create a new strategic architecture, one in which it operates more consistently with and through other countries, it must both trust those countries and enable them to do more in their own defense and to address common strategic challenges. Traditional allies need and deserve our trust. It is important, therefore, that the Obama Administration move forward on the defense trade cooperation treaties with Great

Britain and Australia. In addition, key allies need to be given access to more advanced U.S. military technologies and allowed to acquire the best U.S. weapons systems. There are some examples of this, such as the international partnership on the Joint Strike Fighter and international sales of the Aegis missile defense system. Secretary Gates needs to provide more specificity regarding his vision for U.S. friends and allies and encourage them to acquire the needed capabilities so as to play a greater role in meeting those shared security challenges.

Based on Secretary Gates’ recommendations, the Obama Administration has proposed sweeping reforms to the U.S. export control and technology transfer system. The administration proposes replacing the present system of multiple lists with a single, “tiered,” “positive” list focused on the items that need to be controlled/protected. The “tiered” list will distinguish the types of items that should be subject to stricter or more permissive levels of control for different destinations, end-uses, and end-users. There will be three tiers based on the critical value of the system or technology and the extent of its availability. The “positive” list concept is based on the principle of a fact-based case for control, rather than the current system of anticipating the potential for diversion and requiring proof that the possibility will not happen. There will be a single set of licensing policies that will apply to each tier of control. Most important, items on the third tier may only require a single, initial license.²⁸

It will take time to develop a new strategic architecture that supports empowered collaborative defenses. What initial steps could be taken to begin this process and also engage key friends and allies? This study recommends the following initial steps:

- **Develop a strategic vision that would underpin a strategic architecture.** The vision would define long-term U.S. goals for collective military capabilities and capacities in the regions of interest. What is it we want to be able to do collectively and how could our friends and allies contribute? How might relationships be structured over time to enable the United States along with its friends and allies to achieve collective goals? What should friends and allies be able to do on their own, taking some of the burden off of U.S. forces and what needs to be done to enable regional partners?
- **Conduct regional net assessments that include partner military capabilities alongside that of the United States.** Such assessments may already be available for Europe but are needed for the Middle East/Persian Gulf and East Asia. These assessments need to examine not just military equipment or evaluate operational capabilities but also look at political and procedural roadblocks to regional collaboration.
- **Create an inter-agency working group chaired by the National Security Council to focus on empowering collaborative defense.** The working group would focus on ensuring coordination in the U.S. approach to the range of issues associated with empowering collaborative defense from the global laydown of U.S. forces to military-to-military contacts, security treaties and arms sales. This working group also could address export control issues involving major regional allies.
- **Expand the portfolio of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD/GSA).** There should be a focal point for the effort to develop a new strategic architecture. One place is the office of the ASD/GSA which is already responsible for multilateral issues such as missile defense. Another option is to create a new ASD position that is a counterpart to the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs which addresses the range of concerns that would be appropriate in building a new security architecture. More closely aligning functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense with those of the Department of State could also facilitate cooperation between the two.
- **Enhanced bilateral interactions.** The United States should look for ways of sustaining or even increasing senior level interactions between defense department civilian and military leaders and their counterparts in the nations of interest. Among the subjects for discussion should be ways of empowering friends and allies to do more for their own security and to collaborate better with others in the region. Consideration also should be given to expanded military-to-military activities and to additional cross-regional military exercises.
- **Simplify the Department of Defense export control system.** The Obama Administration has proposed sweeping reforms to the structure and practices for export controls. Within the Department of Defense a single point of contact should be designated for coordinating its export policy and processes. The process of approving defense exports within the department must be streamlined with firm deadlines for review, response and appeal. Duplicative review boards should be consolidated. Reviews should be conducted concurrently, rather than sequentially. A process for single authorizations for all but the most sensitive transactions should be created.

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GLOSSARY

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| ASD/GSA | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs |
| DCI | Defense Capabilities Initiative |
| GCC | Gulf Cooperation Council |
| GSD | Global Security Dialogue |
| ISR | Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NSS | National Security Strategy |
| PAC-3 | Patriot Advanced Capability 3 |
| PCC | Prague Capabilities Commitment |
| PLA | People's Liberation Army |
| PLAN | People's Liberation Army Navy |
| QDR | Quadrennial Defense Review |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| THAAD | Terminal High Altitude Area Defense |

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