E-7 Wedgetail Shock Threatens Air Superiority in the Pacific (From National Security Journal)

The full text of this article is available below and in National Security Journal at the link here.

Key Points and Summary – The Pentagon’s shocking decision to cancel the E-7 Wedgetail program threatens decades of American air superiority.

-Intended to replace the aging E-3 AWACS, the E-7 provides critical airborne early warning and battle management essential for combat in the Pacific. While the Defense Department points to future space-based systems, experts warn this technology is not mature enough to fill the void.

-This premature cancellation creates a dangerous capability gap, forcing a reliance on inadequate “Band-Aid” fixes, jeopardizing operations against China, and risking billions of dollars in allied investment in the proven Wedgetail platform.

Elon Musk and his team are no longer prowling Washington, DC, but at the Pentagon, there is still damage control needed from the rush to slash programs. 

For decades, American fighter and bomber pilots have counted on a massive advantage: airborne early warning that sweeps the skies for hundreds of miles to detect enemy fighter planes and missile threats.  The mission of the venerable E-3 AWACS rarely made headlines, but the eyes in the sky and the primetime battle management has paved the way successful air operations.  The 2026 Air Force budget request aimed to field seven new E-7 Wedgetail radar planes by 2029 to maintain this capability and remain prepared for combat in the Pacific. 

Now the plan is in disarray.  A sudden Pentagon decision to scrap the acquisition of the E-7 could open up the biggest gap since the Vietnam War, and leave the Air Force to fall back on Navy planes and space satellites to fill in the gaps. 

“We believe most of the ISR, or a great deal of ISR, in the future will be space-based,” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said of the E-7 decision.

True, but not in time to counter China. 

Networks can now pass target tracks to pilots from multiple sources.  Yet the E-7 remains

vital to air battle management over the Pacific and in other theaters.    The E-7 Wedgetail has already been proven in operations by Australia, Great Britain and others, and has been deployed to assist the air defense picture for Ukraine.  The E-7, like AWACS, tracks both aircraft and ships.  In June, the E-7 demonstrated unmanned teaming with two MQ-28 Ghost Bat drones acting as loyal wingmen. 

The shock cancellation threatens air superiority in the Pacific – bad news for all joint and allied forces.  Chalk it up to a premature push to favor new space missions, ready or not. 

What the new Defense Department staff overlooked is the fact that the Air Force has been talking about moving Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) missions to space since at least the late 1990s.  The Air Force would leap on the chance to save money and carry out AMTI from space if it felt the capability was ready.  But while space-based AMTI has improved dramatically, space systems are not yet mature enough to take over all the combined radar warning and battle management functions. 

“This is a capability that our Air Force tells us we need,” Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK) said recently of the E-7.  “Nobody tells me we’re ready to transfer this capability into space. Eventually, we get it in space, we think, but you’ve got to worry about the here and now.”

Chief of the Space Force General Chance Saltzman explained that space offers a lot of advantages, but “it isn’t necessarily optimized for the full spectrum of operations that your military is going to be asked to do….And so that’s where I think you need a mix of systems.”

American forces have counted on the airborne early warning edge for so long that few remember what it was like for pilots to be blind to the wider air picture. 

Airborne radar planes date back to the 1950s when the Lockheed EC-121 Warning Star provided additional coverage of the high north against Soviet bombers and missiles.  The EC-121, the AWACS’ predecessor, was next deployed during the Vietnam War to offset the advantages of Chinese ground radar stations detecting U.S. fighters.  Like its predecessors, the EC-121 and the E-3 AWACS, the E-7 has a gigantic, far-seeing radar.  It also has banks of radios and communications and a crew aboard to carry out surveillance of all airborne traffic, identify enemy aircraft, and warn and vector friendly fighters to intercept.  This battle management function is the heart of airborne early warning and not a mission that can be transplanted to space at present. 

AWACS got heavy use deconflicting Coalition flight operations during the wars with Iraq.  Imagine the target saturation over the Pacific with Chinese and Russian aircraft in the sky. 

Given that full proliferated space constellations aren’t yet ready, another Band-Aid fix was for the Air Force to rely on the Navy’s carrier-based E-2D Hawkeye.  The E-2D is a phenomenal fleet asset as proven in the Red Sea and many other operations, but it is a smaller plane designed for a different mission set and built especially for carrier landings.  Navy E-2Ds have practiced joint “hot refueling” at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, but this should not be mistaken for a theater-wide combat surveillance capability. 

As with all forces deploying to the Indo-Pacific, survivability is an increased concern for the E-7.  China is surging its military capabilities and presents challenges in both the “gray-zone” coercion operations around the littorals and bluewater scenarios near the Second Island Chain and beyond.  This threat assessment is not new.  Flying the AWACS in battle was never 100% safe.  For the Air Force, the AWACS was regarded as more survivable in the air than a comparable radar system on the ground.  The 250-mile-plus range of the AWACS radar outstripped enemy missile ranges.  Any enemy fighter foolish enough to close in on the AWACS would be in the glare of constant surveillance – easy pickings for a friendly fighter.  Longer-range air-to-air missiles like China’s PL-15 have increased the risks across the theater.  But the stark fact is that airborne early warning is more essential than ever in a mass air battle involving China.  And space is not a sanctuary. 

The preponderance of analysis shows that E-7 is a vital capability and indeed “critical to the China contingency.”   Here’s another snarl for Congress to untangle. 

Don’t forget about Golden Dome.  After 9/11, the demand for AWACS in the United States was so high that NATO invoked Article 5 to send allied AWACS to patrol U.S. airspace.  E-7s could be a vital part of any Golden Dome system activated to defend the United States. 

Killing the E-7 is also a bad business decision.  For starters, the Air Force had a plan to leverage a $9 billion investment from Australia, Saudi Arabia, and others for E-7 radar and systems upgrades.  That may collapse if the Pentagon’s decision holds.  Furthermore, over 30 E-7s have been ordered by allies, including Canada.  The allied investment makes E-7 one of the few new aircraft where allies are buying a leading share, all of which is now at risk.

It may be that airborne battle management and moving target indicator functions will one day reside mainly in space.  Until then, the warfighters must be heeded when they say they need E-7 Wedgetail.