

AN ARMY AT WAR



AND THE 2005 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ★

The United States Army is at war. It is also transforming. There is nothing new about either situation. The Army mobilized, fought a war and transformed itself in the 1940s. However, that was sixty years ago. It is now being called on to do the same, and more. It must not only change its organizations, equipment and processes while fighting a war, it also must change the way it thinks. The Army must do these things in the context of being a member of a Joint Force, a concept only barely understood in the 1940s. It must do these things while enduring tight resource constraints.

For the Army, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is about demonstrating that the measures it is taking to improve its effectiveness for operations across the spectrum of conflict are central to meeting the goals and objectives set out for the military in the *National Security Strategy* and *National Defense Strategy*. The Army also needs to make it clear that its efforts to reset the current force, create a new modular structure, introduce new technologies, rebalance the Active and Reserve Components and stabilize units and the lives of its soldiers constitute an integrated plan. Change, eliminate or under-fund any part of the plan and the entire enterprise will be placed at risk.

The Army needs to make investments in the capabilities that will support its vision of a campaign-quality force that is expeditionary, flexible and joint – such as the Stryker and Future Combat System. It also means a range of C4ISR capabilities to enhance battle space knowledge and connectivity to the rest of the Joint Force. It includes the restructuring of Army aviation, which will result in more than 1,000 new platforms and new programs such as the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and Light Utility Helicopter. Finally, it includes a new logistics system that will reduce in-theater footprint while simultaneously enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the supply chain.

The QDR process also needs to recognize and account for the Army's growing dependence on joint capabilities. To make itself lighter and more expeditionary, the Army is reducing its organic fire support capabilities and will rely more on air and missile assets from the other Services. The Army is also dependent on the Air Force to provide air dominance, theater-level intelligence and adequate lift. The QDR must ensure that in its effort to balance risk it does not undermine the Army's efforts to become a more effective part of the Joint Force.

Overshadowing the entire QDR process is the reality of limited resources. Past QDRs have avoided making hard choices that reflect both the demand for military capabilities and the size of defense budgets. It would be a mistake to “kick the can down the road” again.

INTRODUCTION★

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) comes at a pivotal point in the history of the United States Army. The Army is at war. Along with the U.S. Marine Corps, the Army is bearing the brunt of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In addition, it is taking on increasing responsibility for achieving stable post-conflict environments both in those countries with whom we have warred and elsewhere where instability could breed chaos and terrorism.

Without question, the Army is undergoing enormous stresses. More than 250,000 soldiers are deployed overseas. Some 150,000 Guardsmen and Reservists have been activated. It has been reported that what was to be a temporary increase in end-strength of 30,000 would now be permanent. This is ironic considering that early versions of the 2001 QDR proposed cutting the active Army by two divisions and a corps headquarters. There have been calls from many quarters to further increase the size of the Army, perhaps by as much as 100,000.

At the same time, the Army is in the midst of a major transformation, involving not only a restructuring of its forces, but also the development of new doctrine and concepts of operation, the creation of new training regimes, the introduction of new technologies, the restructuring of the Guard and Reserves and a strategic redeployment from positions it has occupied for some fifty years. The Army is confronted by the additional stress of implementing the decisions of the Base Realignment and Closure process.

Another looming reality is that of limits on future defense budgets. A series of budget supplementals are all that has kept the Army afloat. It cannot be assumed that the budget experience of the past several years will continue indefinitely. Indeed, as soon as U.S. forces begin to be withdrawn from Iraq, pressure will grow to reduce or at least cap defense budgets. The Army will have to struggle to simultaneously recapitalize forces worn out by years of heavy use, maintain an enhanced training process and pursue transformation.

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that many observers feel that the QDR should seek to make the Army “whole.” However, the challenge facing the Army in the 2005 QDR is not to prove that it has served the Nation well in the past. Rather, it is to demonstrate its value to the Nation in terms of the new challenges and according to new ways of measuring the utility of force components. The Army must demonstrate also its capability to address a full spectrum of threats, participate more fully in homeland security, contribute to stability and support operations (SASO) and assist friends and allies in coalition activities. In addition, it will have to show how Army transformation contributes to the overall effectiveness of the Joint Force and what joint enablers the Army brings to the table.



Recent discussions of the challenges facing the U.S. Army have largely focused on its proper size or end-strength. More important than the issue of force size is that of roles and missions. In view of the GWOT and the rise of new threats and security concerns, the Army cannot assume that its traditional role as the centerpiece of conventional war fighting will be a sufficient justification for its place among the Services and its claims on budgetary allocations.

The Army will need to respond to a number of questions.

- What makes the Army a strategic force for the future?
- In light of new threats and scenarios, how central is the Army's conventional war-fighting capability to its future roles and missions?
- What should the Army do to better address unconventional and asymmetric threats?

STRATEGY AND THE QDR★

The Army should approach the 2005 QDR in the context of the impacts upon it of a changed security environment. It must also respond to the additional demand by the Bush Administration that the Army, along with the other Services, address more fully the missions of homeland security, assistance to friends and allies and stability operations.



Source: 2005 Army Annual Posture Statement

The QDR will be informed by the experiences of the past four years. More significantly, it is a forward-looking document intended not to assess how well the military can address the threats of the past and the present, but rather how it is shaping a course to meet the threats of the future. There are a number of controlling realities that will shape the direction of the QDR. These include: the range of new threats, evolving national security and national defense strategies, the introduction of transformational weapons systems, networks and supporting capabilities and the pursuit of new coalition and alliance opportunities.

The 2005 QDR is the first that is strategy driven. The official strategy guidance for this QDR is provided by a series of high-level policy documents that establish the strategic context for the QDR, in particular the *National Security Strategy (NSS)* published in September 2002 and the recent *National Defense Strategy (NDS)* in March 2005. Together, these documents describe a new security environment marked by uncertainty, the rise of new, non-traditional threats and the need to preserve U.S. preeminence. According to the NSS, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the

embittered few.”¹ Addressing these threats, as well as the possibility of the rise of new competitors with advanced conventional and asymmetric/catastrophic capabilities, requires a very forward-leaning political military strategy. The Rand Corporation describes the *NSS* in this way:

The strategy does not envision that U.S. interests and general stability can be safeguarded without the presence and sometimes active application of American political, economic, and military power world-wide. Thus, embodied in the strategy is a clear expansion of the demands placed on the military, in responding to terrorism abroad and ensuring the security of the American homeland, in maintaining American preeminence as a military power, and in preempting attacks against the United States by terrorists and rogue states, particularly attacks that might involve weapons of mass destruction.²

The *NDS* expands on this problem statement, defining four classes of threats: traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive. It defines strategic objectives consonant with the vision laid out in the *NSS*. Overall, U.S. military forces must be able to defend the homeland, operate forward in the four key regions of the world, fight two regional conflicts at a time and conduct other lesser contingencies. The *NDS* also directs a new approach to defining the appropriate attributes of military forces:

The Department is adopting a new approach for planning to implement our strategy. The defense strategy will drive this top down, competitive process. Operating within fiscal constraints, our new approach enables the Secretary of Defense and Joint Force Commanders to balance risk across traditional, irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges.³

The *NDS* defines the desired capabilities for future U.S. forces. It envisions a U.S. military that is capable of projecting decisive power rapidly to long distances and into new locations and also of protecting the homeland, allies and forward forces from all types of attacks. The military must be able to conduct operations in two theaters. Such forces will operate seamlessly as part of a joint force. They need to be pursuing continuous transformation to reduce vulnerabilities and reinforce war-fighting advantages. Transformational activities focus on eight operational attributes:

- Strengthen intelligence
- Protect critical bases of operation
- Operate from the global commons
- Project and sustain forces in distant anti-access environments
- Deny enemies access to sanctuaries
- Conduct network-centric operations
- Improve proficiency against irregular challenges
- Increase the capabilities of international and domestic partners





According to published reports, the illustrative scenarios to be employed in the 2005 QDR are radically different from those that informed it in 1997 and 2001. In particular, they downplay traditional large-scale conventional conflicts in favor of the challenge posed by asymmetric threats. In addition, the Department of Defense (DoD) has designated four focus areas for the 2005 QDR that reflect the new threat construct.

- Building partnerships to defeat terrorism
- Defending the homeland in-depth
- Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads
- Preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by hostile state or non-state actors

Because of the uncertain nature of future threats and the need to respond rapidly to multiple successive crises, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has proposed what has been termed the 10-30-30 strategic posture: U.S.

forces must be capable of deploying to a major contingency in ten days, fight and win in 30 days and be reset and ready for a subsequent deployment in another 30 days. To accomplish this objective, U.S. forces must be able to deploy swiftly to intercontinental distances, conduct high intensity joint and combined operations in theater and be refitted and ready for redeployment without delay. The 10-30-30 concept has enormous implications for the character of all U.S. forces. In particular, it implies that the U.S. military will not be designed to fight protracted conflicts or conduct long-term, stable deployments.

There is one more concept that will inform the 2005 QDR – the idea of overmatch. Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense employ this term to describe areas of capability where U.S. forces are so far ahead of those of any conceivable adversary or threat that there exists an excess of capability. The argument that the excess or overmatch in certain capabilities needs to be reduced to provide resources to invest in other capabilities appears to run counter to the idea expressed in the *NDS* that the U.S. needs to extend existing war-fighting advantages.

The picture created by this mosaic of threats, strategies, attributes and scenarios would seem to suggest the need for ground forces very different from those that exist today. The requirement to secure the homeland once involved little more than providing air and missile attack warning. Three of the four dominant threats were not on decision makers' radar screens five years ago, and clearly do not require the large, heavy combined armed forces built for the Cold War. Indeed, as recent conflicts show, the existing force posture is one which significantly overmatches almost any conceivable adversary in most domains.



THE ARMY AND THE QDR★

The Army is the Service most dramatically affected by the changes in national security and defense policies over the past few years. It is also the Service that has been most challenged to transform itself in order to deal with the threats of a new era. The central challenge confronting the Army in the 2005 QDR is to demonstrate how it is responding to the array of new threats, demands and metrics while simultaneously fighting the GWOT, resetting the existing force and continuing to transform into the force of the future. The Army is transforming itself into a force, in its own words, “designed for continuous operations in a new era that presents challenges to the Nation ranging from traditional to potentially catastrophic.”⁴

The key issues confronting the Army in the 2005 QDR can be grouped into five basic categories: Roles and Missions, Doctrine and Concepts of Operations, Force Structure, Modernization and Transformational Investments, and Personnel and Training. Such an analytic approach has the virtue of simplicity and follows, more or less, the schema of the QDR’s six Integrated Product Teams or Task Forces. However, in the case of the Army, there are many crosscutting or interrelated issues. For example, an answer to the question of how large an Army depends, in part, on how rapidly the Army can transform and whether it can rely on the other Services for joint enablers such as fire support, airlift, and tactical and strategic intelligence.



Roles and Missions

The purpose of an army is to fight and win its nation’s wars. According to the *2005 Army Posture Statement* “the Army’s overarching strategic goal is to remain relevant and ready by providing the Joint Force with essential capabilities to dominate across the full range of military operations.” To do this, it must provide “relevant and ready land power” to the Combatant Commanders. Relevant land power is first and foremost able “to conduct prompt, sustained combat on land as well as stability and reconstruction operations, when required.”⁵

The relevance of ground power, to use the Army’s own term, must be understood in four dimensions. First, it is the ability as part of the Joint Force to take and hold ground, anywhere, anytime and for any duration. Second, it is the capacity to support so-called stability and humanitarian operations. The experience of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated that such operations may have to be conducted in parallel with combat operations. Third, relevance means the capability to address new threats, whether terrorists or loose nukes. Here the ability to assist

allies and partners to defeat terrorism is critical. Fourth, relevance now includes the new mission of supporting homeland security. The Army also will continue to provide much of the logistics support for the Joint Force. The Army recognizes this challenge:

Providing and sustaining ready and relevant ground forces and capabilities in this era of persistent conflict requires a totally new approach to how we organize, man, equip, train, modernize and transform our forces.⁶

The Army cannot slight its central war-fighting mission. It must maintain the capabilities to engage in theater-level ground campaigns. However, as OEF and OIF clearly demonstrated, the nature of such campaigns is likely to be very different in the future than they were for most of the Army's history. Future campaigns are likely to involve relatively little advanced warning and preparation time, anti-access threats, complex and unfamiliar geography, non-linear non-contiguous battle spaces, minimal supportive infrastructure and limited local support.

In addition to being a major contributor to a joint war-fighting capability, the Army must address its leading role in stability and support operations. Such operations can no longer be addressed as a lesser case. But the Nation cannot afford two Armies, one for war and one for peace. The reality is that in many scenarios the same forces that will take and hold ground will be required to ensure stability, establish order and conduct essential reconstruction and humanitarian missions.

Counterterrorism was once virtually the sole province of Special Operations Forces. Now, as Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, the mélange of rogue nations, failing states and international terrorist groups makes it all but impossible to segregate responsibility for dealing with terrorist threats or new dangers such as loose nuclear weapons. The Army will need to consider how it can stretch its existing forces to participate in joint counterterrorism operations.⁷

Similarly, the mission of providing support to U.S. coalition partners in their own efforts to defeat terrorism and the threat posed by rogue regimes cannot be treated as a lesser included case subordinate to the Army's traditional war-fighting role. In Afghanistan and Iraq one of the Army's most critical functions has been to assist in the development of indigenous security forces. The Army needs to develop a core competency in training and military assistance to coalition partners and regional allies.

Finally, the Army commands critical assets in support of both homeland defense and homeland security. But who actually should be responsible for homeland security/civil support within the Army? Both the federal government and the states view the National Guard as playing a critical role in emergency response and damage-mitigation efforts in the event of a national emergency. By prior design, the Guard contains much of the Army's combat support and combat service support capabilities, precisely those assets that would be called on in the event of a domestic terrorist incident. In addition, the Guard is investing in new capabilities such as the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) that could complement the Department of Homeland Security's aerial fleet.

It has been suggested that the National Guard be assigned primary responsibility in this area. However, the Army will always be dependent on the Guard to support expeditionary operations, particularly if they are extended. The homeland security mission could be in competition with that of projecting relevant land power overseas. Yet, the Army cannot avoid the reality that in



the event of an incident, it too will be called on to support homeland security. Therefore, the Army needs to develop a contingency strategy that will ensure its ability to respond both to domestic crises and to overseas commitments.

Doctrine and Concepts of Operation

U.S. national security documents are clear about one point: that the DoD cannot plan for conflicts with well-known enemies in familiar places. Nor can the military expect to have the kind of warning available prior to Desert Storm and OIF. The NSS states clearly that in an age of catastrophic terrorist threats, “the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.”⁸ Future conflicts will be “pick-up games,” probably taking place in distant parts of the world and with little preparation time. As one senior Army officer noted:

This will require an Army that is highly responsive to the call of our civilian leaders. We must be able to deploy anywhere, anytime in overwhelming force when that call is made.⁹

To meet this requirement, the Army has set for itself the objective of building a campaign-quality force with joint and expeditionary capabilities.¹⁰ It must be able to deploy rapidly over strategic distances, conduct highly mobile operations on the ground regardless of the terrain, and maintain itself in the field for the time necessary to achieve a decisive outcome.

The campaign-quality force must be lighter than has been the case historically. It must also make greater use of joint capabilities in such areas as fires and effects, air and missile defense, intelligence and strategic transportation. By shifting responsibility for many of these functions to other components of the Joint Force, the Army can make itself more strategically deployable and tactically agile. For this transformation to be effective, the other components of the Joint Force must provide the necessary capabilities.

The Army long ago recognized that if it was to become expeditionary, it would have to deploy faster and maneuver with greater speed on the ground. This meant that it had to become lighter. The driving vision behind the Stryker brigades and the Future Combat System, dating back to former Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, was to create lighter combat systems and smaller, more deployable formations. There are other avenues for improving the Army’s expeditionary potential including greater reliance on joint forces, streamlining logistics and unmanned systems.



There are several ways to make the Army lighter. The most obvious way is to reduce the weight of platforms. Another is to reduce the amount of supporting hardware and the supplies that must be deployed with the force. A third way of lightening the force is to make it more effective, thereby reducing the size of the contingent that must be deployed to a contingency. It was a central premise of former CSA General Shinseki's vision that the way to make the Army lighter was by reducing the weight of its combat platforms. Given the difficulty in meeting the goals set for the Future Combat System (FCS) systems, the Army would do well to look for other ways of making itself lighter.

The Army's strategic mobility is dependent also on the support provided by the other Services. The Army has a critical interest in the future of the Air Force's lift capabilities. The Air Force must maintain sufficient C-17 and C-130 aircraft to rapidly deploy large Army formations to theater distances. The Army also has an interest in the Navy's program for Seabasing and fast sealift. Another way of making the Army more expeditionary is to expand on existing maritime and land-based prepositioned force packages, possibly combining these with a class of fast transports such as the High Speed Vessel the Army employed in the Persian Gulf for several years.

The Army is becoming particularly dependent on joint capabilities to perform its strategic missions. It needs to ensure that the QDR adequately protects essential joint enablers. Indeed, in the QDR, the Army needs to press to have activities such as intelligence, civil affairs, medical support and logistics made inherently joint. It also should support efforts by the Air Force to acquire sufficient F-22 Raptors to ensure its continuing dominance of the air.

In order to meet the requirements of conducting rapid, decisive campaign-level operations, the Army is looking to reconfigure its structure and supply base to enable the first 30 days of an operation to be conducted without the need to mobilize the Guard and Reserve. This is the reason for the program to rebalance the mix of units and skills between the Active and Guard/Reserve Components. The Army is reconfiguring its stocks for global coverage of potential missions. Each prepositioned stockpile will have sufficient combat power to meet the demands of a theater response to an immediate threat, as well as sufficient resources to render relief in other contingencies.

The Army has yet to develop an adequate doctrine and concept of operations for homeland security. Doing so is rendered more difficult by the unsettled nature of the homeland security problem and continuing organizational turmoil in the Department of Homeland Security. Given the scarcity of resources it is difficult to envision the Army creating units configured and trained solely for the homeland mission. Nor is this approach necessary. Many CONUS-based formations, particularly in the restructured National Guard, have the inherent capability to respond to homeland scenarios. The Army needs to consider how it would include homeland security tasks in its unit rotation system. Perhaps in the process of resetting and refitting units returning home from overseas deployments, an additional homeland security responsibility could be assigned.





Finally, a rapidly deployable, campaign-quality, jointly-enabled Army requires a new, transformational logistics system. The system needs to be fast, transparent, maintain connectivity and information flows from the factory to the foxhole (and back again) and, ultimately, joint. It also must engage the entire supply chain, rather than just the distribution system. The Army has demonstrated the possibilities for a new logistics system with its Rapid Fielding Initiative and the Rapid Equipping Force.¹¹ An expanded role for the private sector should be explored. When the Army faced a shortage of small caliber ammunition, Alliant Techsystems – the manager of the Lake City Ammunition Plant – was able to rapidly expand production four-fold. Private logistics providers such as UPS and Maersk could supplement, extend and even replace DoD logistics forces. In addition, the organic base, consisting of arsenals and depots, is beginning to work more closely with the private sector. For example, the Army's Anniston depot does the final assembly work on General Dynamics' Stryker armored vehicles.

Future Force Structure

Many outside observers have argued that the Army is overstretched and that the solution is to significantly increase its end-strength.¹² This misstates the challenge facing the Army. It is not its size that challenges the Army in this new era; it is the way it is structured. Adding more end-strength without addressing a host of structural issues would be irrelevant at best and, at worst, potentially harmful.

The Army has a plan in place to address its structural problems and thereby make it relevant, ready and, as a more capable member of the joint team, better able to address the range of missions it now confronts. This plan has a number of elements:

- Resetting the Force
- Converting to a Brigade-Based, Modular Force
- Rebalancing Active and Reserve Component Units and Skills
- Stabilizing Soldiers and Units to Enhance Cohesion and Predictability¹³

The cardinal principle of the Army's effort to recast its structure is to make efficient and effective use of its existing manpower and equipment before seeking to increase its overall size. It does little good to add more soldiers and even more units to the Army if the processes by which the overall force is managed, deployed and supported are not transformed. Each of the efforts discussed below form part of a whole which will create and sustain the Army's vision of a campaign-quality force.

Resetting the Force. The age in which deployments by the Army out of garrison were the exception and force planners could expect long periods of peace in which to rebuild units is over. Moreover, OEF and OIF are wearing out people and equipment at a significant rate. The current reset program will take two years after major operations cease, to repair all the major items used in OEF and OIF. Currently, this amounts to about 1,000 aviation systems; 124,000 communications and electronics systems; 5,700 combat/tracked vehicles; 45,000 wheeled vehicles; 1,400 missile systems; nine Patriot battalions; and approximately 232,000 items from various other systems. In addition, more than 20,000 vehicles in Iraq have received additional armor. Only heroic efforts by the Army's depots and arsenals, in partnership with the private sector, have kept the reset program on track.

The above discussion reveals an interesting paradox in the Army's efforts to adapt to the demands of a new strategy and simultaneously address the realities of new types of conflicts. Although the Army's goal is to lighten itself, thereby becoming more strategically deployable and tactically agile, at present it is actually getting heavier. The Army reaffirmed the value of heavy armor for survivability in both OIF and in its stability operations in Iraq. In addition to the uparmoring of light and medium weight vehicles, the Army has a Selective Upgrade Program for the M1 Abrams. It has also contracted to purchase more than 800 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs). Thus, the Army will have to struggle to find ways of reconciling its requirements for mobility and survivability.

The core idea behind the reset program is to do more than merely restore units to their pre-deployment capabilities. Rather, it is to propel these units into the future. Units in the reset process are reorganized into modular formations, receive retraining, have their equipment sets restored to like-new status, and are provided with new systems that are being spiraled into the force. Properly managed, the reset program will enable the Army to support a consistent and measured tempo for the deployment, return and refit of its formations.

Converting to a Brigade-Based, Modular Force. Conversion of the pre-OEF/OIF Army to a brigade-based, modular force is intended both to increase the supply of deployable units and to establish the basis for the generation of mission-specialized force packages. Ultimately, the Army intends to standardize its combat units into three types: a heavy brigade, an infantry brigade and a Stryker brigade. There will also be five modular support brigades. When completed, the Army will have between 77 and 82 brigade combat teams. Moreover, the number of brigades in the Active Component will be increased relative to the number in the Reserve Component. The result is more deployable and usable military power for little or no increase in the size of the force or its equipment base.

The Army will need to demonstrate, both in the QDR process and in the field, that its new modular designs will result in a more deployable, agile and effective force. It will need to demonstrate this fact not only for the current force, but also for that which it anticipates creating with the Future Force. The process of demonstrating the wisdom of the Army's plan will begin with the return of the first redesigned, modular division, the 3rd Infantry Division, to Iraq.

Rebalancing Active and Reserve Component Units and Skills. By rebalancing the mix of units and skills between the Active and Reserve components, the Army can achieve three goals. First, it can reduce the need for early mobilization of Reserve assets. Second, it will be able to better

match the skills and capabilities of reserve units with the *NDS* statement of desired force attributes. Third, it will enhance the ability of the Guard and Reserve to meet potential homeland security commitments.

Rebalancing is a major part of the Army's larger effort to redefine the relationship between the Active and Reserve components. The goal is the more effective employment of the Guard and Reserve, thereby reducing the need for an increase in the overall size of the Active component and also reducing the stress on Guardsmen and Reservists. In return, the Army needs two things. First, the Army must have assured access to the Reserve component when needed. Second, there needs to be a flexible modernization of the Reserve component that focuses on its full range of potential missions, not just conventional war fighting.

There is a need for a new contract with the Guard and Reserve. If Afghanistan and Iraq are models for the future, then changes need to be made in how the Reserve component is activated and employed. To the extent possible, both the timing and duration of activation need to be predictable. At the same time, the Army needs to have greater leeway in how it can make use of activated Guard and Reserve personnel and must address the costs associated with their activation.

Stabilizing Soldiers and Units. Finally, the Army has initiated a program to stabilize soldiers and units. The idea is to enhance individual and family morale, organizational cohesion and overall effectiveness by reducing the level of turbulence in individual assignments and unit deployments. Ultimately, it is hoped that both Active and Reserve component units can be put on a predictable deployment cycle, one year in three and one year in five respectively.

Taken together, the combination of modularity, reset, rebalancing, and stabilization provides the means to maintain the Army at a high operational tempo for the foreseeable future. It should also permit a process of continuous transformation with units undergoing reset, acquiring new capabilities and the associated training.

The Army needs to make it clear that its current program of modularity is intended to respond to the demands of a new strategy and an expanded mission set. The Army is simply too small to create separate force structure elements for major combat operations, stability operations and homeland security. For the Army, managing risk must come in the form of a force structure that is flexible and adaptable.

In addressing force structure, the Army must focus on more than just its combat forces. Combat support and combat service support capabilities are vital to the Army's ability to address emerging missions and to its contributions to the Joint Force. The Army plays a vital role in logistics for the Joint Force. Logistics and deployability are likely to loom large in the ability of the Army to respond rapidly to future regional contingencies.

Ultimately, the Army must be prepared to answer the question: when does quantity have a quality all its own (to borrow a Soviet aphorism)? The Army continues to argue for recapitalization/modernization funding over an increase in end-strength, beyond the 30,000 requested to enable the construction of the modular force. Managing end-strength is one way to deal with risk. It may be an acceptable risk to hold end-strength steady in the near term and focus more investment on capabilities for the long term. However, as the QDR unfolds and scenarios are examined, the Army may have to acknowledge that it will require additional manpower.

Modernization and Transformational Investments

The Army faces two interrelated challenges with respect to future investments. It must modernize or reset the current force and it must invest in transformational capabilities at the same time. The current force is being worn out at an alarming rate and must be returned to a useful state.

The Army must also invest in the future if it is going to meet its transformation goals and ensure a place of relevance in U.S. defense strategy.

The most critical Army transformational investments are to enhance the strategic and operational mobility of the Army. Many of these programs provide new combat capabilities. All are intended to operate as part of the Joint Force. The first of these is the Stryker. The Stryker brigades deployed to Iraq have demonstrated tremendous operational utility. More readily deployable than standard heavy Army units and more mobile on the ground than infantry formations, the Stryker brigades fill a unique role. The Stryker clearly addresses several of the critical attributes for U.S. forces identified in the *NDS*.



The second is the Future Combat System. The FCS is a system-of-systems involving manned and unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sensors and weapons, integrated by a highly sophisticated command and control system. The belief is that the exploitation of advanced technology in such areas as networking, remote sensing and unmanned platforms will allow the creation of combat units that are lighter than current brigades but with equal or greater effectiveness. Current reports suggest that the principal manned ground vehicles will weigh approximately 24 tons. This is much lighter than existing heavy armored vehicles but still greater than the desired weight. At a per-vehicle weight of over approximately 20 tons, moving FCS-equipped units will require additional airlift assets.

In the context of a continuing high operational tempo and the demands for modernization, the Army must explain the relevance of the FCS program. It must also ensure that the FCS continues to provide near-term benefits to the current force. This means that the effort begun in June 2004 with the restructuring of the program to ensure the spiraling of FCS capabilities into the current force must be successful. The test of the restructured program will be the ability to rapidly introduce command and control and networking capabilities into the force. Other key systems targeted for early introduction in the force include unattended ground sensors, intelligent munitions, non-line-of-sight launch systems and cannon artillery and UAVs.

The third program designed to enhance the Army's mobility and flexibility is the restructuring of Army aviation. The cancellation of the Comanche program allowed the Army to reset its aviation fleet, acquiring almost 1,400 new or modernized platforms and initiating new programs for an Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) and a LUH. The ARH will take on some of the missions planned for the Comanche and replace the venerable OH-58D Kiowa Warrior that has proven extremely valuable in Iraq. The LUH will provide transportation in low threat environments. These two programs are also innovative in another dimension; the Army is seeking a derivative of a commercially available helicopter.



The Army is investing in networks and advanced communications systems intended to radically enhance its ability to collect, move and use information. Great success has been achieved with the Blue Force Tracker derivative of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System. The Army's LandWarNet is its part of the DoD Global Information Grid. It is intended to provide seamless communications to enhance the movement and use of information in support of both war fighting and business processes. The Army is also investing in communications systems for the war fighter such as its portion of the Global Command and Control System and the Joint Tactical Radio System.

In addition to these transformational programs, the Army has responded to the lessons of OEF and OIF with a host of initiatives intended to provide the soldiers in the field with enhanced capabilities. One such effort was the provision of additional armor protection for Humvees, Strykers and

other relatively light-skinned vehicles in the theater. Hundreds of additional armored vehicles such as the ASV have been ordered. Special body armor, tactical UAVs and counter-IED (improvised explosive device) technologies have been deployed to Iraq.

In order to shrink the logistics footprint, increase joint force effectiveness and reduce costs, the Army is pursuing a plan to transform its logistics system. It is doing an exceptional job in developing techniques and systems to connect logisticians, streamline legacy processes and redefine priorities, thereby strengthening the supply chain from factory-to-foxhole. The Army is developing modern business processes, taking account of logistics requirements during the acquisition cycle, improving the operations at its depots and increasing the war fighter's confidence in the supply chain.

The Army is moving aggressively to modernize and transform its equipment, processes and personnel. The Army believes that its program will create the kind of force that reflects the critical attributes identified in the NDS and provide capabilities with which to address the challenges identified in the QDR terms of reference. The Army needs to demonstrate how these transformational efforts will bear fruit and enable the development of a campaign-quality force.

Personnel and Training

There are many factors which are stressing the Army's personnel and training systems. The combination of a challenging strategic environment and an improved economy is leading to difficulties meeting recruiting goals, even with increases in signing bonuses. The effort to stabilize the force and increases in retention bonuses are signs of concerns in the Army about its ability to ensure retention of seasoned Non-Commissioned Officers and midlevel officers, particularly if their future consists of more Afghanistans and Iraqs.

In the event the QDR concludes that an increase in Army end-strength is necessary, recruiting and retention difficulties could undermine that decision. How large a force is feasible given the size of the recruiting pool, high recruiting standards and available funding for recruitment and retention? Could the struggle to reach recruiting goals necessitate a change in Army personnel policies? There are already indications that the Army will have to lower its entrance standards and increase its investments in recruiting in order to ease the personnel problem.

The Army, indeed all the Services, must consider what implications the GWOT has for their personnel and training policies, and does this suggest the need for different types of entrants? The Army likes to speak of the “strategic corporal,” the lower echelon leaders that are the core of the Army’s ability to succeed in both counterinsurgency operations and SASO. It should emphasize its efforts to empower the “strategic corporals” and to provide them the training and resources necessary to support different operations.

The Army has made major strides in responding to the demands of the new strategic environment with revised training programs. The most obvious change is the emphasis on high combat skills for all personnel. As a result of the lessons of OEF and OIF, the Army is now requiring small arms proficiency for all its personnel. Another change is its new emphasis on Military Operations on Urban Terrain training. The Army needs to aggressively address the need for language skills and cultural awareness in the broader force, both Active and Guard/Reserve.

The 2005 QDR is principally concerned about managing the risks posed by the challenge of multiple threats in the near term and great strategic uncertainty over the long term. No Service fully understands the difficulty of addressing multiple threats across time. According to the Army’s 2005 Posture Statement:

To reduce the risk associated with operations in support of the Global War on Terror, in the aftermath of September 11, we have made numerous decisions to allocate resources to immediate, urgent wartime needs. These decisions, made prior to and during 2004, have better enabled our Soldiers to accomplish their missions. Our challenge, in the months and years ahead, will be to establish a balance between current and future investments that will keep risk at moderate levels as we support the execution of the full scope of our global commitments while preparing for future challenges.¹⁴



CONCLUSIONS★

The Army's plan is designed to establish a balance between current and future investments in such a way as to provide capabilities with which the Joint Force can meet any of the possible threats envisioned in the QDR. The combination of elements in this plan – resetting the force, going to a modular design, rebalancing the Active/Reserve mix, stabilizing the force, restructuring Army aviation, transforming logistics and revolutionizing training – form an integrated, even synergistic solution set. To eliminate or significantly change any one element could cause the entire program to unravel. Completing the full set of reforms is necessary if the Nation is to have an Army for the range of missions and severity of threats that are likely to arise in the future.

The Army appears to understand what it must do. It needs to become more strategically deployable and operationally agile. This means deploying more compact formations, where and when possible, with lighter vehicles and equipment. It must invest in networks, sensors and information technology. It must complete its move to a modular brigade design. It means transforming logistics and restructuring Army aviation.

But to get to where the Army wants to go will take time and resources. The Army is being strained to sustain its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, reset the force and manage its transformation all at the same time. It was uncertain that the Army could manage to find the resources to meet all its commitments even before the extended operations in Iraq.¹⁵ It is difficult to see how the Army can be asked to do more without receiving more support. To which risk category, the GWOT, a nuclear-armed rogue state or a future peer competitor should the Army pay less attention?

Today, the United States Army is a big organization that is striving to think and act in smaller increments while retaining its core competence in large-scale combined and joint operations. At the same time, it is seeking to mirror the practices of the private sector in areas such as logistics, moving from a distribution model to one that emphasizes a factory-to-foxhole supply chain and end-to-end connectivity. These are challenges as much to the Army's way of thinking and to its culture, as it is to its organizational abilities. The 2005 QDR is about the imperative to change mindsets, approaches to conflict and ways of organizing and operating military forces. Demonstrating that it is meeting the challenge of thinking differently is one of the most important measures of success for the Army in this QDR.





ENDNOTES:

- ¹ National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), September 2002.
- ² The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy, Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, Editors, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p.8.
- ³ The National Defense Strategy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, March 2005.
- ⁴ 2005 Army Annual Posture Statement, United States Army, Washington, DC, p. 1.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Lieutenant General David Melchor, “Deputy Chief of Staff: QDR Must Examine Long Range Ground Force Strategy,” Army, Association of the U.S. Army, May 5, 2005.
- ⁷ Special Operations Command is quoted as expressing interest in acquisition of Stryker armored vehicles. An alternative would be to create task forces in which Special Operations Forces and Stryker brigade elements train and operate together.
- ⁸ NSS, p. 5.
- ⁹ Melchor.
- ¹⁰ 2005 Army Annual Posture Statement, p. 6.
- ¹¹ Tim Kennedy, “Rapid-Fielding Team Tasked to Transform Army Acquisition,” National Defense, February 2004.
- ¹² Tom Donnelly, The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine, AEI Press, Washington, DC, 2005.
- ¹³ 2005 Army Annual Posture Statement, pp. 6-11.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 21.
- ¹⁵ David Kassing, “Resourcing the 21st Century Army,” in Davis and Shapiro, op. cit., Chapter Twelve.



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