

**CITIZEN-SOLDIERS
AND HOMELAND SECURITY:
A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense expects that the National Guard will provide the preponderance of its support to homeland security. Lessons learned from the opening phase of the war on global terrorism also leave no question but that the National Guard needs to be a large, capable, flexible force, prepared to serve at home and overseas. Consensus ends there. The defense establishment continues to debate the scope of the changes required to make the National Guard better prepared to respond to 21st century realities. A strategic assessment of this challenge concludes that more robust homeland security forces are necessary to respond to emerging threats, while finding that so far current initiatives have not provided the types of capabilities needed to prevail in a new kind of protracted war.

Greater capacity to defend against homeland security threats is needed in areas which include: countering maritime and low-air attacks; combating anti-access strategies; protecting against civilian infrastructure attacks; and responding to catastrophic terrorism that could kill tens of thousands. Civilian response and counterterrorism assets will not be adequate to respond to these dangers. A more robust National Guard homeland security capability is required.

Several ongoing National Guard programs such as reorganizing commands as joint headquarters; restructuring units; expanding the number of civil support teams; upgrading GuardNet, a nationwide communications, information and training system; and fielding missile defenses will provide important niche capabilities for supporting homeland security tasks. They are, however, individual initiatives that alone won't ensure that the Guard has the right set of core competencies to support homeland security.

While the Defense Department has identified the key post-Cold War challenges it faces in transforming the Guard, it still requires a more holistic and comprehensive approach to domestic security. U.S. homeland security strategy needs to provide more specific guidance. In addition, the National Guard requires units specifically organized to accomplish domestic missions, including forces better prepared to respond to catastrophic terrorism, protect critical infrastructure and provide maritime defense. A common training and information architecture with the Department of Homeland Security should also be created. Finally, the Defense Department should establish new acquisition programs specifically geared to domestic missions.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States has fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, promulgated new strategies for protecting the nation, created a Homeland Security Department and spent over one-hundred-billion dollars on domestic security. In part, this rush to action was justified. Long before 9/11 many experts had noted unaddressed shortfalls in homeland defenses as well as the rising threat of transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Still, over two years later, the appropriate goals and limits of the effort to protect Americans – how much and what kind of security and preparedness are enough – are far from clear. For its part, the Department of Defense expects that the National Guard will provide the preponderance of Pentagon support for military assistance to civilian authorities. Consensus ends there. The defense establishment continues to debate the scope of the changes required to make the National Guard better prepared to conduct this mission.

While the dialogue over the future role of the National Guard is continuing, there are a number of initiatives already underway. They appropriately suggest a substantially larger role for National Guard forces in support of homeland security, particularly with respect to preventing or responding to catastrophic terrorist attacks. But, there are great challenges as well as opportunities. Fulfilling an expanded role would require significant modifications in the Guard's organization, operational practices, training and equipment. It is still unclear whether ongoing projects or future ones will result in a significant transformation. Still, the prospects exist to create a National Guard better prepared to defend the homeland, as well as support the range of military operations worldwide required to meet the needs of America's national security.

ONE DAY IN SEPTEMBER

On an otherwise uneventful morning, in an act of unwarned aggression an enemy attacked the United States with an airplane. The calendar read September 9, 1942, sixty years before four hijacked airliners crashed in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. A seaplane launched from the submarine *I-25* dropped four, small incendiary bombs near Brookings, Oregon. The Japanese high command intended the assault to be the opening sortie of a campaign, ravaging the Northwest forests and demoralizing the American people. The raid proved a disappointment. Three bombs were duds and the fourth blackened a lone stand of trees before forest rangers doused the sputtering flames. Despite the ineffectual results and a handful of other feeble attempts to strike at the

continental United States during World War II, the government still took extraordinary precautions to protect the homeland. Watching over 16,000 ports and other key infrastructures alone required more than 200,000 personnel.

Today, the lone bombing raid and the effort to secure the nation during wartime remain largely forgotten historical footnotes. Yet, the events and their remembrance are, in an important way, emblematic of the national experience. Many Americans assume that for most of their nation's history the distance and the isolation provided by two oceans made their ancestors feel secure. The attacks of 9/11 presented new and unprecedented dangers. These assumptions are wrong. Thousands of miles of border and coastline, wealth and resources, vast territory, a diverse population and an open civil society have long made America a tempting target. Every generation has experienced the anxiety that they might be attacked in their own homes. Each generation has also faced the responsibility of making difficult choices and crafting an appropriate strategy to defend the homeland. Now, it is the turn of post-9/11 America to set its priorities.

If there has been one constant in strategies for protecting the nation, it has been a prominent role for the National Guard and its antecedents, the state militias whose role in homeland defense extends back to colonial times. At the outbreak of World War II, for example, much as in the wake of 9/11, guard troops secured transport systems and flew aerial patrols. As historian Michael Doubler wrote, "Guardsmen posted on rail platforms at the nation's major railway stations calmed the fears of Americans still shaken by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor." Historically, securing the homeland has always been an intrinsic part of the National Guard's mission. The question is whether such an approach is relevant to the military tasks of the 21st century.

THE GUARD AND THE FUTURE OF TERROR

The past is not always prologue. While traditions are important, the emerging nature of future threats are, perhaps, even much more significant in arguing for a prominent role for the National Guard. In the years ahead the United States could face a dizzying array of threats mounted by diverse enemies. Civilian agencies lack the means and capacity to handle these problems on their own.

The future is a hostile place. Regardless of the nation's foreign policy, the United States' wealth and power will draw the attention of malevolent regimes and transnational terrorists. Life after the Cold War has proved that. The *Aum Shinrikyo* cult, which conducted the 1995 poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway and which had \$1 billion in assets at its disposal, planned on conducting attacks in America to prompt a prophesized global nuclear war. *Al Qaeda*, a radical transnational Islamic group that directed the 9/11 attacks, fervently argues that the United States must be destroyed because it is the "master" of "slave" governments in the Middle East that must be overthrown by a new Islamic order. In fact, long before 9/11, experts had largely reached a common view on three key points about the future security environment.

- The diversity of possible threats is increasing.

- Enemy nations may rise to challenge the United States, though it is difficult to predict which countries might do so.
- There will be more non-state threats.

These trends alone might not make homeland security a significant concern for the Pentagon, except that the age when only great powers can bring great powers to their knees is over. Experts agree: future threats may reach American shores; civilian institutions (including federal, state and local assets) lack the capacity to deal with them; and the consequences of a successful attack could be devastating. Particular concerns are:

- In any conflict, the homeland could be a tempting target. An enemy might attack U.S. territory as part of an “anti-access campaign,” striking targets here to prevent the deployment of American forces elsewhere. For example, the overwhelming bulk of U.S. military power is still dispensed around the world by ship. Much of the ammunition and critical hardware move through four Defense-owned port facilities. Attacks that interfered with ports during the height of a foreign crisis could prevent combat forces from even leaving the United States. A recent Defense Science Board report emphasized the importance of improving the security of critical defense infrastructure. Civilian law enforcement simply lacks the assets to deal with these kinds of problems.
- Critical civilian infrastructure could also be at grave risk. For example, a survey of 15,000 chemical facilities suggests that on average over 40,000 people might be exposed to a toxic chemical release as the result of a terrorist attack. Reducing the vulnerabilities of such critical infrastructure is a particularly difficult problem, since much of it resides in the private sector and significantly enhancing protection could prove extraordinarily expensive. To meet the challenge, the government must rely on a mix of regulatory policies, public-private partnerships and self-policing, methods that are bound to be insufficient to eliminate every major weakness.
- There are also threats that come from the air and sea which can deliver devastating attacks and for which the United States is unprepared. For example, short-range ballistic missiles, widely available on the global arms market, could be outfitted with virtually any kind of warhead from relatively inexpensive high explosive bombs to nuclear devices and launched from a make-shift vertical launch system. Operating in nearby waters outside the purview of officials in the Department of Homeland Security, any commercial surface ship could become a covert, ballistic-missile carrier. Likewise, low-level air threats could become a serious problem. Readily available cruise missiles can be modified into effective land-attack weapons. Even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could represent substantial dangers. Launching ten small UAVs off a commercial freighter outside territorial waters would enable an enemy to mass over 1,000 kilograms of payload on a single point. In fact, fielding low-air, surface, or subsurface maritime

threats is only limited by an enemy's imagination. For example, small boats or commercially available manned and un-manned underwater vehicles could also become potent weapons. Both the U.S. Coast Guard and civilian organizations lack the means to deal with these dangers.

- Attacks on the United States could also inflict catastrophic destruction, killing tens of thousands and causing hundreds of billions of dollars in damage. These include nuclear weapons delivered by missiles or smuggled to their target and virulent biological weapons that could be dispatched in a number of ways, including agro-terrorism. Alternatively, an enemy might increase casualties by conducting multiple attacks. By placing the same amount of resources dedicated to several efforts into one synchronized operation, an enemy might achieve far greater effects than could be realized by several disparate strikes – in effect creating “weapons of mass disruption” even without weapons of mass destruction. Catastrophic or multiple attacks could well exceed the capacity of a civilian response. A 2003 report by the Council on Foreign Relations found that unmet needs for emergency responders could exceed \$98.4 billion. Even if all their requirements were met, civilian responders alone would likely be inadequate to rapidly meet the immediate needs of a catastrophic attack.

The newly created Department of Homeland Security could spend enormous sums to field “military-like” capabilities. States and local governments could be saddled with the inordinate expense of maintaining the massive response capacity needed to meet the demands of catastrophic terrorism. Alternatively, the nation could rely on the “dual-mission” responsibilities of the National Guard, its capacity to support civilian authorities at home, as well conduct worldwide military operations. Rather than trying to be strong everywhere, civil authorities could depend on the Guard to bridge the gap between civilian capabilities and the capacity needed to respond to major terrorist threats.

At the same time, the likely requirement for U.S. forces overseas makes an equally compelling case for a strong National Guard. While some experts have called for making homeland security the Guard's *primary* mission, the Defense Department and many security analysts recognize that this would be impractical. As at home, the nature and severity of threats overseas could vary significantly in future decades. Unlike the Cold War – where, when, for what, and how long military forces will be needed won't be predictable. A chart of future requirements might look more like a sine wave, with the need for troops whipsawing up and down. Meeting such demands efficiently and cost-effectively calls for a military that is highly flexible, expandable and professional. The National Guard is the ideal force to build a long-term capability to meet diverse and rapidly changing requirements, globally and locally.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

What distinguishes the National Guard as a uniquely capable force for homeland security is a combination of long-standing organizational, legal, and policy precedents and post 9/11 initiatives by the Defense Department.

The Guard's Legacy

National Guard troops are frequently referred to as “citizen-soldiers,” part of the military’s substantial Reserve Component force. Reserve forces are only called to service for limited periods. The majority of units assemble one weekend per month and two weeks per year for training. Some reserve members are called up to serve for several weeks or months. A few remain on active duty full time, normally to provide support to Reserve forces. Finally, Reserve forces can be called up for periods of one to two years (such as recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq), or if Congress declares war or a national emergency they can be activated for the duration of the war or emergency plus six months. Limited service makes the citizen-soldier, a tradition derived from the earliest colonial militias, still possible. Individuals can balance their military commitments with civilian employment while allowing the military to rapidly expand its capabilities in times of crisis.

The military’s Reserve Components consist of the Guard and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard Reserves, approximately 47 percent of the nation’s available military forces. The National Guard contains the Air and Army National Guard, about 52 percent of the available Reserve forces and 26 percent of the total military. In 2003, the Army National Guard had about 351,000 members, representing about 34 percent of all the soldiers in the service. The Air National Guard has authorized about 112,000 personnel, approximately 20 percent of the Air Force. In some areas, the Guard represents a significant portion of the armed forces’ military capability. For example, 32 percent of the fighter planes designated to support overseas missions are in the Air National Guard. The military’s current organization has several implications for the future.

The size of the Reserve, particularly the National Guard, is substantial and likely will remain so. To a global power with diverse security interests they represent an effective alternative for sustaining a considerable military capability without relying on a large-standing force or conscription. This became readily apparent during the turmoil of the Vietnam War. In 1970, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird saw the reserves as the best means to balance expansive defense commitments and constrained resources. It was, he wrote, the key to maintaining “a larger Total Force for a given budget or the same size force for a lesser budget.” The concept of relying on the Reserves as the primary means of augmenting active forces became Pentagon policy in 1973. Their primary advantage is relatively clear – in 2002 the Reserve Components provide just under half the available force for about 7.8 percent of the annual national defense budget. The reasons they are far cheaper are simple to understand: when they are not acting as full-time troops they have lower operating and training costs, receive only part-time pay and fewer benefits, and require less infrastructure support (such as no need for family housing). Guard forces obviously cost more when used on a full-time basis, but using them for temporary periods in selected operations is still far cheaper than permanently maintaining additional capability in the active force.

National Guard forces will remain distinct from other Reserves. They serve as constitutionally recognized state militias and a Reserve Component force. In other words, they play both state and federal security roles. The National Guard of each state or territory is commanded by its governor. Governors can assign state missions as allowed by state constitutions and statutes. The state is also responsible for funding these missions. Individuals or units in the Guard, and other Reserves as well, are called into federal service under either Title 32 or Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Title 32 covers federally funded, non-federal duty status, which includes periodic training periods and participation in Congressionally directed domestic programs such as drug interdiction. Under Title 32, Guard forces remain under state control, but the U.S. government funds operations. (There are limits to what troops are permitted to do under this code section. They cannot, for example, be paid to conduct training with civilian emergency responders.) Under Title 10, Guard forces perform federal duty under the command of the President. The ability to employ the state Guards under varying command authorities is one their most versatile features, and for both constitutional and practical reasons they will always retain their dual responsibilities.

The National Guard will continue to enjoy a unique legal status. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and amplifying Defense Department regulations generally prohibit the armed services from engaging in law enforcement activities in the United States, such as investigating, arresting or incarcerating individuals. The Act does not apply to National Guard forces unless they are mobilized as federal troops. Thus, under current law, only the Guard, under state control, is legally unconstrained in the homeland security support roles it can perform. Posse Comitatus is not likely to be amended (though Congress can grant exemptions). The Defense Department recognizes that the Guard will be the force most often used to supplement state and local law enforcement. In addition, the Act has never been a serious obstacle to having federal forces support domestic operations. The military can provide logistical aid, loan equipment, and offer technical advice, facilities and training. As a result, the Pentagon has stated that it has no intention of requesting changes to the law. Even if changes were envisioned, it is unlikely they would be adopted. Post-9/11 legislation, such as the U.S.A. Patriot Act, and federal anti-terrorism activities have generated an extended debate over their impact on civil liberties, making it unlikely that any administration would seek to revise Posse Comitatus and create the impression of further impinging on the rights of civil society, particularly to obtain authorities that might have very limited utility. The Guard will likely keep its special status.

National Guard organization and command structure will remain distinctive. Under state control, forces are commanded by an Adjutant General, who oversees both Air and Army National Guard troops. The Adjutant General provides the governor unity of command over the forces at his disposal. At the same time, the National Guard Bureau in Washington, DC, though not formally a command headquarters, exercises major supervisory functions over the state and territorial guards. By law, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, a three-star general, is the official channel of communications between the states and the military services. Most importantly, the Chief also serves as the appropriations authority for all federal funds allocated to the states. In short, the

bureau's role is to assist the military services in meeting their constitutional responsibilities to raise, train and maintain federal military forces. There does not appear to be a more efficient and practical alternative to the current command relationship. Since the Adjutant Generals command both Army and Air Force troops no single service could perform the bureau's functions.

In summary, the United States is likely to retain a large, multi-mission force capable of performing both federal and state missions. The real issue is whether the National Guard will have the resources to perform its tasks effectively.

The Impact of Change

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Pentagon modified organizations, policies and programs to clarify its role in homeland security. These initiatives, as well as the continuity of the Guard's present size, command structure and legal status, will play an important role in determining how it supports domestic missions. The full impact of these changes on the National Guard is not yet clear.

The Defense Department is struggling to define its role. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security, prohibits the new agency from engaging in the "military defense of the United States," and reaffirmed that "warfighting" activities were strictly the responsibility of the Defense Department. The Act did not, however, specify the appropriate role of the Pentagon in domestic security operations. Nor does the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security detail the Pentagon's role. The Defense Department has sought to spell out responsibilities by developing doctrinal distinctions to prescribe and limit its tasks in the domestic realm. The Department describes its mission as *homeland defense*, protecting U.S. borders and waters against traditional military threats. *Homeland security*, on the other hand, is "detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States." In this framework, the Department's only major homeland security responsibility is to provide support to civil authorities *when directed*.

The distinctions between homeland "defense" and "security" seem to have little practical or legal utility. Also, it is not clear that America's enemies will clearly recognize these boundaries and limit their methods and operations so that they can be countered either by the military or other federal agencies as appropriate. In fact, they may seek to use these artificial distinctions to find gaps and seams in U.S. security that can be easily exploited. Second, in practice, many federal agencies will play a role in countering terrorist threats. Attempting to create artificial distinctions between these missions contributes little. In short, the Defense Department's effort to draw a bright red line between it and the Department of Homeland Security is the least useful of its current initiatives. A better method for defining the Pentagon's role is needed.

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) lacks focus and resources. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks the Pentagon created NORTHCOM under the unified command plan,

which prescribes the geographic boundaries and functions of the combatant commands charged with conducting U.S. military operations worldwide. NORTHCOM is responsible for the defense of the United States. The command is also responsible for providing military assistance to civilian authorities, including military support (responding to the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks), assistance for civil disturbances, support to law enforcement, counter-drug and counter-terrorism efforts, critical asset protection and responding to the use of weapons of mass destruction. National Guard troops supporting domestic missions (while serving in Title 10 status) would be commanded by NORTHCOM. The Command recognizes that while Guard forces may be called upon to support any combatant commander that they are particularly important to NORTHCOM. “We can't have a Northern Command,” declared NORTHCOM commander General Ralph Eberhart, “we can't provide for the homeland defense and the homeland security of this great nation and this area of responsibility without the National Guard.” To promote cooperation between the Guard and NORTHCOM, 23 slots in the Command have been specifically designated for National Guard personnel. In addition, the National Guard Bureau works closely with NORTHCOM providing updates on the location, status and capabilities of Guard forces.

NORTHCOM, however, remains significantly deficient in several respects. It lacks the capabilities to deal with emerging maritime and low-altitude air threats. The Command also does not have a clearly defined mission for protecting critical infrastructure. NORTHCOM, in fact, is not even responsible for directing the protection of forces and defense infrastructure in the United States. In addition, it is without a comprehensive systematic training, communications and information-sharing network to link it to civilian emergency responders (such as local fire, police and medical assets). Finally, NORTHCOM lacks assigned forces optimally prepared to perform homeland security missions.

The lack of appropriate force structure is most troubling. Recent operations have demonstrated that the need for such troops could be substantial. For example, in January 2003, some 9,000 Army National Guard troops were called up nationwide to augment security at 163 Air Force installations. In many cases, these forces were replacing Air Force security units who had been overstrained by the increased demands of guarding bases in the wake of 9/11. As a U.S. General Accounting Office report concluded, present “forces are not tailored for some of the [domestic] missions that they have been performing since September 11, 2001, and the result could be the eventual erosion of military readiness.”

Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense faces significant challenges. Congress also created this position in response to the 9/11 attacks. The Assistant Secretary supervises the Defense Department’s homeland defense activities and coordinates requests for assistance and cooperative ventures with the Homeland Security Department. The Assistant Secretary has played an active role in establishing working relationships within the Department and other federal agencies to coordinate domestic security activities.

Since the office is newly established it is too soon to evaluate its efforts, but there is cause for concern. Answering to the Undersecretary for Policy, the Assistant Secretary provides overall policy direction, but has yet to set strategic guidance resulting in significant new programs. As the Army's Reserve Component Coordination Council concluded, "funding streams for homeland security related requirements are difficult to capture. There are no specific budget entries for homeland security or homeland defense." The lack of investment reflects the absence of strong Department initiatives.

In addition to policy responsibilities, the Assistant Secretary also will have to oversee a wealth of other activities, including transferring technology to the Homeland Security Department and coordinating all military support to civilian agencies. Managing these tasks, many of which cut across the responsibilities of the Defense, the Air Force and the Army secretariats, will be a difficult managerial challenge. The Secretary's task is complicated by the fact that the Army and Air Force address homeland security differently. The Air Force formed a Homeland Security Directorate under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, but also maintains a separate Air Staff section for civil support. The Army created a homeland security integrated concept team, led not by the Army Staff but by a Director of Homeland Security at the Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia. As a result, it is not clear the National Guard's requirements are being adequately addressed in terms of policy, strategic guidance or program needs.

In summary, the major reforms undertaken by the Pentagon have provided the conceptual and organizational structure to guide its homeland security program, but they have yet to produce results that will significantly better prepare the National Guard.

New Capabilities

While the Pentagon continues to wrestle with management of its homeland security responsibilities, the National Guard's force structure has not remained static. Since 9/11, the Guard has continued to evolve the means to support domestic missions.

The National Guard is reorganizing its headquarters as joint organizations. Joint operations involve the combined activities of units from more than one service. One of the hallmarks of defense reform has been the growing capacity of the armed forces to efficiently conduct joint warfare. Until this year, however, both the Guard Bureau and Adjutant General's state headquarters included separate directorates for the Army and Air Guard. The Guard is now in the process of merging all these staffs into a joint headquarters, as well as encouraging states to include representation from other military components, including the Coast Guard, in their commands. This initiative has three major implications for homeland defense missions. First, it should make the bureau more adept at working with NORTHCOM, already a joint headquarters. Second, the state headquarters in times of crisis might serve as the nucleus of joint task forces, expanding NORTHCOM's capacity to extend its command and control throughout the country without the added overhead from creating more headquarters. In particular, joint state commands will be better able to coordinate the reception, employment and logistical

support for Title 10 forces that might be required to respond to domestic security operations. Third, joint headquarters will be prepared to serve as coordinating centers with regional, state and local emergency response organizations, providing for better integration of civilian and military activities.

Unfortunately, the Guard and NORTHCOM have yet to agree on a program to integrate the state headquarters into a national emergency command structure. Synchronizing NORTHCOM's need for operational field headquarters and the Guard's reorganization could save resources and improve the military's responsiveness.

National Guard's Civil Support Teams (CSTs) provide a back-up capability to civilian responders. First established in 1998, each CST is staffed with 22 Army and Air National Guard personnel. CSTs are self-contained mobile units equipped with extensive communications and chemical, biological, nuclear, and explosive detection and analysis equipment. They can be used to support either state or federal operations, though federal law bars them from being used outside the United States. They cannot even be used across the border in Canada or Mexico. Initially the organization, equipping, training, and indeed the utility of these units, was highly controversial. However, they have proven to be in high demand by state authorities. By September 2002, the teams had already conducted over 700 missions and innumerable training exercises. Currently, 32 states have full-time CSTs and 23 have part-time units. Congress has authorized the Pentagon to field 12 more full-time teams and asked the Pentagon to include funding for the remaining full-time teams in its fiscal year 2005 budget request. It is clearly Congress's intent that each state and territory have its own team.

While the CSTs have proven themselves useful, their utility is limited because they are not integrated into an overall Defense Department strategic response structure. They lack, for example, organic security, rapid transport and logistic support. As a result, they may not be able to respond quickly in a crisis, and once there the CST's support requirements only place additional burdens on state and local authorities. In addition, because they are prohibited from worldwide deployment, CSTs cannot be used for other appropriate defense missions. These teams would be far more effective if they were integrated into larger, deployable commands, similar to the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), a one-of-a-kind, brigade-size, disaster response force that includes detection, decontamination, medical, security, communications and logistical support in one unit.

The Army is in the process of restructuring selected Guard units. The Army National Guard plans to take some armored commands and combat support units, like artillery and air defense, and reorganize them as lighter and more flexible infantry-centric organizations, including mobile, light brigades and other units as well. The Army, for example, is planning on fielding 19 new military police companies, mostly from the spaces allotted to field artillery commands. The Guard Bureau has proposed "dual-missioning" some support units and, when required, forming them into task forces to provide capabilities similar to the CBRIF. The Guard, for example, plans to create ten Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE)

Enhanced Response Force Packages that might include CSTs, a medical company with decontamination assets, an engineer company with search and rescue capability, and a combat unit capable of supporting law enforcement.

Restructuring initiatives, while encouraging, has three significant shortfalls. First, homeland security will be a secondary, not a primary mission, thus troops may well lack the skills, training and equipment needed to effectively respond to catastrophic terrorism. Responding to a major disaster requires highly skilled assets and operating on compressed timelines that leave little room for failure or miscues. A second problem is that many of the existing Reserve forces best suited to these missions are not in the Guard structure. For example, the Army Reserve has the preponderance of the military's medical assets, as well as most of the mortuary, veterinary, signal communications and chemical-biological defense units. Third, some analysts argue the military needs to have far more forces available to respond to catastrophic terrorism than the number currently envisioned by the Pentagon. John Brinkerhoff, a former associate director at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has estimated that as many as half a million Reserve troops might be needed to respond to catastrophic disasters, more than four times the number that the Army has estimated are required for homeland security. Likewise, a 2001 Rand report, *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security*, suggests potentially significant requirements for military forces. Without more forces, Guard restructuring initiatives alone will likely be inadequate to fully address NORTHCOM's needs.

The National Guard's GuardNet and other communications assets provide a national information system that could be used for homeland security. GuardNet XXI utilizes a commercial broadband peerless IP network to link 3,300 sites around the country including 329 classrooms capable of video and audio teleconferencing, allowing real-time, interactive Web-based communications. GuardNet utilizes commercial lines but uses bandwidth that is secure and separate from normal telephone circuits, and is thus less vulnerable to saturation that might plague commercial lines during a national crisis. GuardNet has already been used to support homeland security training and communications. GuardNet, for example, has hosted a prototype of the virtual emergency response training simulation (VERTS), designed for use by CSTs. The system was also used to communicate among states after the 9/11 attacks. The National Guard has worked to formalize GuardNet's requirements, management, and funding and combine it with Army Reserve Network (a similar system), as well as other defense communications infrastructure to help create a more robust backbone for national homeland security communications, training and information system.

While the Guard's proposal to integrate its communications capabilities into a national system is forward looking, progress is largely dependent on the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security establishing a cooperative, integrated communications program. In September 2003, the Department of Homeland Security completed its first review of its overarching information architecture needs. The architecture, however, does not fully address how it will integrate other federal agencies and state and local governments, and the Department has yet to begin serious joint planning with the Pentagon on how it might best leverage GuardNet.

In 2004 the National Guard's ballistic missile defense units will become operational.

Missile defense provides an essential component of homeland security, protecting national infrastructure and population centers from attacks by long-range ballistic missiles fired by Northeast Asia. The *Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States* concluded that a light-weight variant of North Korea's *Taepo Dong 2* missile could achieve ranges of 10,000 kilometers and engage U.S. targets in the northwest United States as well as Hawaii. National Guard troops serving under NORTHCOM will provide the preponderance of forces for defending against these threats. An Army National Guard Missile Defense Space Battalion will provide operational control over ground-based, mid-course interceptors located in Alaska. Plans call for fielding 20 interceptors by 2005. In addition, the fiscal year 2005 defense budget request is expected to fund up to 20 sea-based missiles to add a modest capability to defend against Middle East threats. Over the next decade, demands for Reserves to support missile defense and space operations will likely increase, requiring several thousand personnel.

The Guard's ballistic missile defense responsibilities are an important contribution to NORTHCOM's mission. The command, however, has yet to develop a comprehensive long-range scheme to address other missile threats including sea-launched short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, as well as low-altitude threats including UAVs.

Post-9/11 developments in the National Guard's organization, forces and support systems provide useful niche capabilities that will enhance its capacity to respond to homeland security missions. These, however, are individual initiatives that do not suggest an overall coherent program for ensuring the Guard has the right set of competencies for domestic missions.

Post-Cold War Challenges

Creating a comprehensive, holistic program will not only require better oversight from the Defense Department and a stronger role for NORTHCOM, but also addressing the unique challenges faced in employing the Guard today. The Defense Department has identified the key challenges it faces, but it lacks a comprehensive strategy to adequately address them.

The Pentagon is grappling with the difficult issue of how to rebalance the force.

U.S. military forces were reduced and reorganized in the wake of the Cold War. In particular, the preponderance of support capabilities was shifted to the Reserve Component force structure, based on the assumption that these resources would only be needed in the later stages of a major conflict. Since that time, however, the military has conducted seven large-scale deployments requiring mobilizations of the Reserve Components in numbers unprecedented since World War II. During the heart of the 2003 war in Iraq over 223,000 Reserve forces were on active duty. Among the consequences of the unexpected high demand for military forces have been more frequent involuntary mobilizations and back-to-back deployments of some Reserve forces, particularly units in

short supply such as pilots, air-refueling assets, and civil affairs and military police commands. Concerned that frequent deployments over the long-term could adversely affect Reserve Component recruiting, retention and readiness, on July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed that the services examine how to rebalance their mix of forces and reduce the need for involuntary mobilizations. The Secretary's memorandum also required the services to examine force requirements for domestic missions. The Army and Air Force have largely completed their analysis.

The implications of major rebalancing could have significant implications for the Guard's domestic missions. For example, in some cases the most cost-effective solution to rebalancing might be shifting or increasing the size and number of some Reserve Component forces, rather than disestablishing Reserve units and adding commands to the active force. Some of these force requirements, such as medical, civil affairs and military police are highly compatible with civilian skills and retaining them in the Reserve Component over the long-term might result in better qualified soldiers, as well as maintaining more National Guard units that have immediate application to homeland security missions.

Indeed, the most effective means for reducing stress on the Guard might be to have a larger rotational base from which to draw forces. This approach could fit well with homeland security missions, which might require significant numbers of troops to respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack.

It is too soon to determine the impact of the rebalancing initiative on the Guard and its homeland security missions. The Pentagon cannot make sweeping changes without Congressional approval, though the services could shift responsibilities from unit to unit within components by force structure realignments. For example, the Air Force could direct a Reserve combat search and rescue unit to an air-refueling mission. If the results of the Pentagon's study calls for dramatic shifts between components they will undoubtedly be the subject of much study and controversy. Debates over rebalancing will likely become embroiled with increasing demands from some Congressional quarters to raise the size of the active force by as many as 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers.

The role of Homeland Security and the National Guard in transformation is unclear. Military transformation reflects innovation on a grand scale, undertaken to exploit major changes in the character of conflict. Transformation of the U.S. military has been a central undertaking of the Defense Department. In particular, the Pentagon has sought to develop a "system of systems," or network-centric operations, that seeks to link the services' disparate capabilities so that they can efficiently share information. Several key defense reports have recognized the need to incorporate Guard and homeland security issues into the military's mainstream transformation efforts. In its annual report the Reserve Forces Policy Board recommended that "the fundamental question of the proper role of the RC [Reserve Component] be consciously addressed and defined as a necessary first step in the transformation planning process." At the same time, the Pentagon's 2002 *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense* concluded, "the Department's planning must be forward looking – beyond the nation's

experiences following September 11 – as future homeland security requirements may be very different.” The Pentagon, however, has yet to clearly define how the Guard and domestic mission fit into its transformation scheme.

While there have been disparate efforts with the joint staff and the services to address transformation issues with respect to the Guard and homeland security so far they have produced little practical result. The Secretary of Defense has created an Office of Force Transformation to serve as an incubator for innovation in warfighting, acquisition and business practices, but the Pentagon has no equivalent for domestic security missions. The Department’s latest transformation planning guidance does not even address homeland security issues. As a result, it is hardly surprising that the services have given the problem scant attention. For example, the Army’s current 108-page transformation roadmap devotes less than a page to the topic. Excluding domestic security from the main axis of the transformation effort may well hamstring the military effort. If the challenge is not an integral component of the Pentagon’s transformation plan, it is doubtful that it will ever get the resources, let alone the intellectual capital, required to foster new initiatives and appropriate programs.

Greater flexibility is needed in employing National Guard forces. One important lesson from the military’s post-Cold War experience is the need to more rapidly deploy Reserve Component forces. In the area of responding to disasters at home, for example, perhaps the greatest need for military forces is in the “6 to 96 hour window.” It is during this time that local responders will normally exhaust their capabilities, determine additional needs, and outside assistance can be rushed to the scene. Here, self-supporting forces that can quickly reach a scene may have their greatest utility. After 96 hours, many post-event tasks can be performed by contractors or additional civilian responders from around the country.

Some Guard leaders argue that the responsiveness of their forces, particularly with respect to domestic emergencies, is not a significant problem. Troops will take action when they learn of a disaster, regardless of whether they have received orders or direction. This phenomenon is known as convergence, when people, goods and services are spontaneously mobilized and sent into a disaster-stricken area. Although convergence has beneficial effects, like rushing resources to the scene of a crisis, it can also lead to congestion, create confusion, hinder the delivery of aid, compromise security and waste scarce resources. This proved to be a major concern during the response to the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. Convergence might be a much larger problem after bigger attacks. In particular, for multiple or catastrophic disasters or simultaneous emergencies at home and abroad, the military cannot rely on haphazard deployments.

In addition to changes in force structure and communications, the Defense Department is investing significant effort in addressing systemic obstacles to rapid and efficient mobilization. Programs are underway to make the administrative processes used to manage all forces, such as medical support, pay systems, training certification and personnel management more seamless. The Department is moving towards a “continuum

of service paradigm,” creating a single administrative structure that will allow personnel to move efficiently between part-time and full-time status.

After the 2003 Iraq War, the Secretary of Defense tasked Joint Forces Command, the headquarters responsible for supplying forces to the regional combatant commands, including NORTHCOM, to make recommendations on improving the mobilization process drawing on the conflict’s lessons. The command’s report, submitted in October 2003, included “quick win” solutions (that could be implemented within three months), near-term issues and long-term goals. Its recommendations are under review.

A concomitant mobilization issue is the “dual hat” responsibility of many guardsmen whose civilian occupations may be integral to counterterrorism or emergency response operations. For example, sheriffs deployed overseas as military policeman are not available to serve their home communities. Doctors scheduled to deploy and provide medical assistance after a terrorist attack might be the same ones manning the local emergency room. Since 1979, the Defense Department has maintained a screening program to ensure that civilian employers can identify critical positions that cannot be filled by personnel who are subject to mobilization. In addition, it has developed a special process to accommodate individual requests for exemptions or mobilization delays. At the same time, the Department recognizes it must better track “dual hat” personnel, as well as identify Reservists with civilian occupational skills that might be needed to address unanticipated military requirements, either for homeland missions or overseas operations.

The Defense Department intends to address the score of mobilization issues with a combination of policy changes, legislative initiatives and information technology programs. Perhaps its greatest challenge will be securing sufficient funding to ensure that new mundane, but critical, information technologies, such as the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) and the Defense Department Smart (Common Access) Card, can help address mobilization challenges.

The National Guard faces enormous challenges in properly equipping and maintaining its forces. Equipment challenges are most significant for the Army National Guard. Even after the Cold War, modernization plans for the Guard were driven by two long-standing policies. First, that the Guard would “mirror” the combat capabilities in the active force, so that they could provide suitable follow-on forces for large-scale conflicts. Second, the Defense Department maintained a “First-to-Fight, First-to-Equip” policy. In other words, new equipment would be issued based on *planned* wartime deployments resulting in only active duty forces and select Reserve units having the most modern equipment.

The defense policies are problematic in two respects. First, to prosecute the global war on terrorism and support homeland security Reserve Component forces responded frequently to contingency operations that did not match planned wartime deployments. Thus, they lacked vital equipment or the means to integrate their older systems with active duty forces. In addition, as high priority units receive equipment, older equipment

is “cascaded” to Reserve units. Often this equipment is beyond its intended service-life age. Equipment must be overhauled and can be more expensive to maintain. When units with older equipment deploy, maintenance costs dramatically increase and reliability declines. In fact, the Defense Department’s report to Congress on the status of Guard and Reserve equipment concluded that Pentagon policies needed to be evaluated “in light of changing roles and missions, potential future utilization, and existing equipment priorities related to the Reserve Components.” In fact, part of the rationale for the Guard’s restructuring initiative is to replace older, armored equipment with wheeled-vehicles that are less expensive, cheaper to operate and more easily maintained.

A second limitation of defense policies is that the first-to-fight principle does not recognize that in the homeland security realm National Guard troops will likely be the “first-in.” Additionally, while domestic missions may require equipment that differs from wartime requirements, there is no systematic means to capture these needs. A 2003 report from the National Academies concluded that the Army National Guard has not had sufficient representation to make its needs known and has no established means to play a major role in determining its science and technology requirements.

The Pentagon needs new paradigms for developing Guard requirements, particularly with respect to homeland security, that eschew the traditional policies of mirroring active and reserve forces, first-to-fight funding and cascading equipment.

Changing demographics and shifts in the modern work place may create new challenges for the military. As the Reserve Forces Policy Board concluded in its 2002 report, *The National Guard and Reserve Forces in the 21st Century: An Analysis of the Total Force*, “the Total Force will inevitably be affected by demographic trends and public attitudes towards military service.” America is aging. The number of Americans reaching the age of 60 every year will jump from around 900,000 per year today to around 2 million per year over the next two decades. Simultaneously, while the U.S. population will continue to grow, it appears that the propensity to serve in the military is declining, according to sociologist Charles Moskos, by as much as 23 percent since 1980. At the same time, the nature of the U.S. workplace is shifting, with more employment in the service sector and individuals changing jobs, residences and even careers more frequently. The result may well be a smaller and less willing pool of men and women of suitable age to perform military service. The armed forces’ traditional measures for ensuring its ability to recruit and retain a high quality all-volunteer force may not be suitable to address these challenges.

The impact of societal trends and changes in public attitudes towards the military as a result of the global war on terrorism will be a subject of controversy in the future. Some service retention data suggests that active and reserve forces are more likely to join and remain in the military when they feel they are serving productively in defense of a vital national interest. In addition, options for military service that provide both predictability for operational deployments for Reserve troops and flexibility in shifting between full- and part-time service would seem more compatible with civilian employment that might include multiple careers and shifting residences. Some argue in this environment Guard

forces, particularly homeland security units, would be well-suited to attracting and retaining personnel. This issue will likely be a subject for serious deliberation as the Pentagon rethinks its long-range strategy for manning the force.

The military has performed yeoman's service in identifying the first lessons of the global war on terrorism and the challenges of employing the National Guard in the post-Cold War world, but it still lacks overarching programs to address these serious concerns.

OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Given the future security environment, recent Defense Department initiatives, and the myriad of challenges facing the employment of National Guard forces, the Pentagon might well seek out new strategic opportunities to create a more holistic approach to its homeland security responsibilities. This assessment suggests the following options for expanding the capacity of the Guard to perform homeland security and integrate its activities more closely with NORTHCOM and the Homeland Security Department.

Revise the national homeland security strategy to define appropriate defense missions. Rather than have the Defense Department prescribe its responsibilities based on its own doctrinal interpretations of *homeland defense* and *homeland security*, the nation would be better served if specific strategic goals were assigned using the critical mission areas established in the national homeland security strategy. Scrapping the Department's definitions and relying on national strategy will provide more holistic guidance, diminish the potential for gaps and seams between the efforts of the Pentagon and other federal agencies, and help establish clear requirements for supporting the national homeland security effort.

Create forces better suited to homeland security missions. The Department of Defense should take another hard look at whether it has forces adequately prepared to deal with catastrophic disaster, to defeat emerging threats and to provide for protection and reconstitution of critical infrastructure. New organizations might, for example, resemble the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, but be organized on a much larger scale with organic detection, treatment, decontamination, evacuation, mortuary, veterinary, environmental monitoring, mental health and security assets capable of addressing multiple large-scale disasters simultaneously in different parts of the country. These forces could then be assigned to NORTHCOM on a rotational basis, where they could participate in a robust training program with state and local responders and provide ready response forces for national emergencies. Fielding these units might also help relieve the pressure on state and local governments now struggling to equip and pay first responders to meet what are essentially national security needs.

An assessment of force requirements also needs to consider the future demand for "homeland security" overseas as well as in the United States. Many areas where U.S. forces might deploy may face the danger of nuclear, chemical or biological strikes. Host countries could well lack the robust infrastructure required to respond to these attacks. In addition, international non-governmental organizations are not well prepared to deal with

the consequences of a weapons-of-mass-destruction attack. American homeland security forces could be needed to provide consequence management for civil population areas where U.S. forces are deployed. In addition, such forces might also be structured to provide support for post-conflict operations, where requirements to restore order, protect or reconstitute infrastructure and provide support to civil authorities might resemble quite closely the tasks performed by homeland security forces. In fact, all the regional combatant commands might have significant uses for security forces. In addition, given their medical, security, logistic, engineer and transport capabilities these forces could also substitute for other conventional units when such assets are in short supply. It would be better to have response forces that are well prepared to deal with catastrophic attacks and save thousands of lives, but could also do other military missions. The current force structure which maintains National Guard forces marginally prepared and resourced to do warfighting tasks that must be reorganized in an ad hoc manner to respond to major terrorist threats.

Future homeland security units should combine National Guard and Reserve forces.

Since much of the capability applicable to homeland security resides in Army and Air Reserve forces, rather than accruing the expense of duplicating these resources in the Guard Structure, Congress could establish legal authorities to allow composite Guard/Reserve homeland security units to function under state control. Congress could establish a Title “X” that permits Reserves to serve under Guard commanders who are not in a federal status. The Congress could also exempt such troops from the restrictions of Posse Comitatus. In addition, Title “X” could establish a program similar to the Congressionally-directed drug interdiction program. It would allow states to draft their own plans for employing Guard/Reserve homeland security forces that could then be submitted to the Defense Department for approval. The Joint Staff would then deconflict these needs for forces with the requirements of the combatant commanders. Once they were approved, operations could be conducted by homeland security forces mobilized under state control and funded by Congress. The advantages of the Title “X” approach is that it would allow states to tailor programs to meet their individual requirements, maintain unity and continuity of command, and allow for coordinating needs and costs of responding to disasters and other contingencies before the event.

Consider creating a Naval National Guard. Given the emerging potential of maritime threat and low-altitude attacks, the United States might be well served to create an organizational structure that better leverages the Navy’s capacity to support homeland security. Several states with maritime interests already maintain state naval militias. The New York Naval Militia, in fact, assisted in the response to the 9/11 attacks. Combining existing state militias into a Naval Guard and expanding this organization to include all coastal states would offer several advantages. A Naval Guard would provide coastal states more resources to address their maritime security requirements. It would also provide an organization within the National Guard and the Navy that saw homeland security missions as an inherent responsibility and would work to develop the requisite competencies and capabilities to fully support these tasks. A Naval Guard would provide a suitable partner for the U.S. Coast Guard for ensuring seamless integration of day-to-day operations between the Defense and Homeland Security Departments in the maritime

realm, allowing active naval forces to concentrate on other responsibilities and contingency missions. Finally, the Guard might provide a more suitable pool of naval forces for NORTHCOM and be used to create additional capacity for sea-based missile and air defense.

Make the National Guard's role in homeland security an integral part of the military's transformation efforts. In addition to creating forces better suited to the missions of the 21st century, the Guard will need appropriate support technologies. In particular, the Pentagon should adapt its efforts to develop a “system of systems” architecture for wartime operations to the homeland security mission. The Defense Department should not only build these capabilities into the National Guard, but in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, integrate them into a true national capability. A system-of-systems engineering approach might produce significant efficiencies in terms of sharing skills, knowledge and scarce high-value assets, building capacity and redundancy in the national emergency response system, as well as gaining the synergy of providing a common operating picture to all responders and sharing information. Network-centric systems might be especially valuable for responding to large-scale or multiple weapons of mass destruction attacks, where responders will have to surge capacity quickly, adapt to difficult and chaotic conditions, and respond to unforeseen requirements.

A systems approach might be equally valuable to the challenge of protecting and reconstituting critical infrastructure. Presently, the Guard's primary contribution in this arena is conducting “mindless” guard duty, a demoralizing task and an enormously inefficient use of human resources. A systems approach, on the other hand, might allow for the military to effectively employ systems like UAVs and unattended sensors in support of domestic operations.

Establishing compatible “system-of-systems” architectures for both wartime and homeland security missions will also provide a focus for modernizing the Guard and ensuring it is prepared to conduct missions both overseas and at home. This approach would base Guard modernization on procuring system enhancements rather than fielding individual platforms, such tanks or airplanes. Thus, the Guard would be prepared to “plug and play” with either more modern and sophisticated active forces or less capable civilian responders.

Adopt a lead-systems integrator approach to the Guard's homeland security needs. A lead systems integrator is charged with designing, developing, testing, integrating, deploying and sustaining a system of capabilities rather than individual platforms. The Army has used this approach in fielding its Future Combat System, a program designed to provide the Army a family of new integrated ground warfare capabilities.

One solution might be to create a *Future Security System* program specifically designed to provide a system of technologies suited to homeland security and post-conflict tasks. It would be based on integrated command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. In addition, it might focus

on providing medical surge capacity, humanitarian support, critical infrastructure protection and reconstitution, non-lethal weapons and other means for expanding for physical security and area control.

Join with the Department of Homeland Security in an integrated planning and training program. The optimal employment of forces and technology requires effective planning and training. The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for the Homeland Security Department to consolidate ongoing activities into a national training and evaluation system. This is a daunting challenge and the Department has made only scant progress towards achieving this goal. NORTHCOM has its own exercise program, but it is not fully integrated with other training being done by federal, state and local agencies.

The military has broad experience in conducting the multi-echelon training for complex tasks similar to those required for homeland security missions. In the future, NORTHCOM could serve as the focal point for the military training contribution to security missions. In addition, there are many areas where the military's training expertise could well support many civilian critical training initiatives such as developing mission essential task lists, establishing multi-echelon training centers, implementing training documentation systems and developing senior professional education. Under a unique organizational arrangement NORTHCOM might serve in tandem with the Department of Homeland Security's Emergency Response and Preparedness Directorate as a federal executive agent for implementing a national training and assessment program and establishing National Homeland Security Training Centers. National Guard forces, which are resident in every state and territory could provide the facilities and force structure for a national training environment. The National Guard state joint headquarters would be ideally suited to coordinate this mission. Existing programs, such as GuardNet, might help provide the infrastructure for a collaborative planning and training environment.

Inadequacy of training integration is not just a problem of aligning organizations, policies and calendars. Homeland security training also lacks a system of systems. Thus, it might also be beneficial here for the Defense and Homeland Security Departments to adopt a lead systems integrator approach to fielding a family of simulations, communications and collaborative planning tools suited to training the entire national emergency response architecture.

CONCLUSION

The National Security Act of 1947 created what became the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, the two premier instruments used to fight the Cold War. But it took about a decade for these organizations to figure out how best to intimidate the Russian bear. The weapons used to deter the Soviets during the Cold War – NATO, U.S. nuclear arsenal and military assistance programs – emerged during this period. It was a time of trial and error, experimentation, innovation and learning from the experience of fighting a new kind of conflict. Today, the war against global terrorism is in a similar

phase. The struggle against transnational terrorist and rogue regimes armed with weapons of mass destruction will also likely be a protracted conflict and, like the Cold War, the U.S. military needs the right set of weapons to compete effectively over the long term.

There is little question that, as in the early years of facing-off against the Communists, there are lessons to be learned from the first phase of conflict suggesting how best to compete over the long haul. In the war on terror, the National Guard has proven itself a valuable strategic asset both in defending U.S. territory and taking the battle to America's enemies overseas. The Guard will continue to be relied on to perform both tasks often, perhaps simultaneously. There is also no question but that the Guard needs to be a large, capable and more flexible force.

The problem is to ensure that the National Guard is best prepared to accomplish missions both at home and overseas. A strategic assessment of this challenge concludes that emerging threats suggest more robust homeland security forces are needed, while finding that current Defense Department and National Guard initiatives are inadequate to provide the kinds of capabilities necessary to prevail in a protracted competition. While the Defense Department has identified the key post-Cold War challenges it faces in adapting the Guard to future missions, the Department still requires a more holistic strategic approach and implementing programs to address the difficult tasks of the 21st century.